A comment on this blog doesn’t usually turn into a blog entry, but it happens. Kinda like, as follows.
Someone who goes by “s” posted this as a comment to the last blog entry here:
Once again, Ayoob lies and creates evidence from thin air when it suits him. In his pathetic apology for the anal rape and torture of man, Ayoob conjured up a “duty of care” (to rape a man!) with zero evidence. Now he lies that members urged JPFO to die rather than accept the SAF takeover. Bullshit. I repeat: bullshit.
There were several parties who attempted to contact the JPFO board. They had alternatives and funding to back up their plans. The tiny August shortfall (roughly $1000) was easily covered; they people had 5-figure sums ready and waiting to be put to use. Ayoob dismisses these attempts at constructive engagement as “vitriol,” and any alternative to a takeover by the organization he represents as “clamored for JPFO to “die with dignity.”
Like the anal rape case, Ayoob creates a new reason that had never before been mentioned. Now his self-interested position as an SAF board member is to preserve the JPFO literature.The more likely outcome is that Gottlieb and his lackeys will suppress and attempt to shove the more strident JPFO work down the memory hole. It’s too uncompromising, too principled, too harsh.That attempt will fail. Neither Gottlieb or his lackey Ayoob can understand what has happened, and what will happen. The materials have already been preserved, by the people SAF and Ayoob love to hate. Watch for SAF attempts to suppress them via claims of copyright infringement. If there was any merit to Ayoob’s testilying, SAF would welcome all attempts to publicsize Zelman’s legacy. But since the truth is that the only prize is the JPFO mail lists, more grists for the for-profit Gottlieb mass mailing machine, that will never happen.
“s,” I will respond to your rant point by point, in order.
You started with the New Mexico case awhile back where you and others accused cops and docs of rape when police transported to a medical center a man they believed had stashed drugs up his butt. I pointed out that anyone who works a patrol car OR an emergency room knows of people who’ve died from doing that. The cops brought him in, the docs did the colonoscopy, and I said we should wait to hear from the cops and the docs themselves why they made the decisions they did. All these months later, those answers still have not come out. I won’t make a judgment until they do. You, and those like you, are perfectly ready to form a lynch mob after hearing only one side of the story. I’m not, and I won’t apologize for that.
“s,” you write, “Now he (Ayoob) lies that members urged JPFO to die rather than accept the SAF takeover. Bullshit. I repeat: bullshit.”
The BS is on your end, “s.” I don’t know whether you deliberately lied, or whether you simply spoke from ignorance, but consider the following:
MamaLiberty, 9/1/14, at Claire Wolfe’s blog “1016” comments: “Nothing is forever, obviously. Seems to me an honorable death of the organization is preferable to what may become of it now… but we were not given a choice in the matter.”
J. Eric Andreasen, 8/22/14, at Claire’s original blog entry on the topic, comments: “Claire, this is simply horrifying. Gottlieb is a KAPO, plain and simple. Better to burn JPFO to the ground and start anew.”
On the same day in the same blog, Claire herself commented: “Kapo. Eric, that’s sad. But true. I tend to agree JPFO would be better off gone than turned into an SAF zombie.”
“Kapo.” A term for Jews who were suborned by the Nazis and led other Jews into the death chambers. A supreme insult to any Jew, particularly the one who just saved Jews for Preservation of Firearms Ownership from oblivion. And your folks don’t spew vitriol, huh, “s”? You say I’m wrong for imputing vitriol, yet in your own post you spew words like “lies,” “evidence from thin air,” “bullshit,” “lackeys,” and “testilying.” Can you spell i-r-o-n-y? Or, h-y-p-o-c-r-i-s-y?
The record shows that JPFO came to SAF, not vice versa. I think the coming months will see JPFO and its message stronger and more widely known than before…no thanks to you and those who think like you. SAF will spread JPFO’s core message and research to a public that desperately needs to hear it, while you’re still hiding behind your cowardly internet anonymity, spewing your venom at people who’ve done more for gun owners’ civil rights than you ever have or will.
If but why when then with where bad stupid evil corrupt incompetent low intelligence civil rights violating brutal poorly trained retarded worthless murderous thug jack-booted militarized useless waste of taxpayer’s money abusive always?
Mas, I challenge you to deny this logic.
Hah! Just as I thought, you can’t even grasp what was asked! How do you expect to stand up against these incredibly intelligent visitors to your blog?
If but why when then with where bad stupid evil corrupt incompetent low intelligence civil rights violating brutal poorly trained retarded worthless murderous thug jack-booted militarized useless waste of taxpayer’s money abusive always?
Mas, I challenge you to deny this logic.
Hah! Just as I thought, you can’t even grasp what was asked! How do you expect to stand up against these incredibly intelligent visitors to your blog?
If but why when then with where bad stupid evil corrupt incompetent low intelligence civil rights violating brutal poorly trained retarded worthless murderous thug jack-booted militarized useless waste of taxpayer’s money abusive always?
Mas, I challenge you to deny this logic.
Hah! Just as I thought, you can’t even grasp what was asked! How do you expect to stand up against these incredibly intelligent visitors to your blog?
Only a miracle can save me now, I guess, Dennis…;-)
But I’ll keep trying. Thank you for your injections of logic and reality. (I hope THOSE injections aren’t a forbidden medical procedure.)
Only a miracle can save me now, I guess, Dennis…;-)
But I’ll keep trying. Thank you for your injections of logic and reality. (I hope THOSE injections aren’t a forbidden medical procedure.)
Only a miracle can save me now, I guess, Dennis…;-)
But I’ll keep trying. Thank you for your injections of logic and reality. (I hope THOSE injections aren’t a forbidden medical procedure.)
Only a miracle can save me now, I guess, Dennis…;-)
But I’ll keep trying. Thank you for your injections of logic and reality. (I hope THOSE injections aren’t a forbidden medical procedure.)
Only a miracle can save me now, I guess, Dennis…;-)
But I’ll keep trying. Thank you for your injections of logic and reality. (I hope THOSE injections aren’t a forbidden medical procedure.)
Mas and Dennis – if it weren’t for your posts here, I would have stopped reading a long time ago. You have managed to make your extremely logical, informed points without resorting to histrionics (well, maybe a little with yours, Dennis :). Also, you have kept the level of discourse respectful – I would have tossed in the towel long ago. Mas, the “miracle” you mention above is – and always will be – those “injections of logic and reality” you and Dennis have been employing.
Mas and Dennis – if it weren’t for your posts here, I would have stopped reading a long time ago. You have managed to make your extremely logical, informed points without resorting to histrionics (well, maybe a little with yours, Dennis :). Also, you have kept the level of discourse respectful – I would have tossed in the towel long ago. Mas, the “miracle” you mention above is – and always will be – those “injections of logic and reality” you and Dennis have been employing.
Mas and Dennis – if it weren’t for your posts here, I would have stopped reading a long time ago. You have managed to make your extremely logical, informed points without resorting to histrionics (well, maybe a little with yours, Dennis :). Also, you have kept the level of discourse respectful – I would have tossed in the towel long ago. Mas, the “miracle” you mention above is – and always will be – those “injections of logic and reality” you and Dennis have been employing.
Mas and Dennis – if it weren’t for your posts here, I would have stopped reading a long time ago. You have managed to make your extremely logical, informed points without resorting to histrionics (well, maybe a little with yours, Dennis :). Also, you have kept the level of discourse respectful – I would have tossed in the towel long ago. Mas, the “miracle” you mention above is – and always will be – those “injections of logic and reality” you and Dennis have been employing.
Mas and Dennis – if it weren’t for your posts here, I would have stopped reading a long time ago. You have managed to make your extremely logical, informed points without resorting to histrionics (well, maybe a little with yours, Dennis :). Also, you have kept the level of discourse respectful – I would have tossed in the towel long ago. Mas, the “miracle” you mention above is – and always will be – those “injections of logic and reality” you and Dennis have been employing.
Mas,
I’m sorry, but your comments there seem rather inconsistent with your previous remarks on the subject. Was the repeated searching of Eckert justified in your view because of a “duty to care”, or was it justified because of the warrant? It can’t really be both, unless you are claiming that the warrant created medical consent for any and all procedures to be performed on Eckert (which would be contrary to medical ethics).
In the previous discussion, you claimed that responsibility for the excessive behavior fell on the medical professionals who performed the procedures. Now you are saying that the police were justified because they had Eckert in custody. Which is it?
And you still haven’t answered the core question I’ve asked repeatedly: What are the limits of this “duty to care” doctrine that you are espousing? How far are the police allowed to go if they have you in custody to save your life against your wishes? Could they force feed someone who has been on a hunger strike for a long period and is facing almost certain death or severe harm to their health if it continues much longer? Could they force a blood transfusion on a Jehovah’s Witness (who has religious objections to the procedure)? Can they force CPR on a prisoner who has expressly declared a desire not to be resuscitated?
By your arguments, each and every one of these civil rights violations could be justified quite easily. In principle, they are no different from your claimed emergency of the suspected drugs Eckert was accused of hiding. The police could argue “necessity” or “competing harms” in each of those cases I described above.
The police didn’t create a threat to Eckert’s life because they suspected he had hidden drugs in his anal cavity. The mere suspicion, even if enough to get a warrant, doesn’t mean that the police created that threat. If Eckert had hidden drugs in his anal cavity, then it is Eckert who would have created the threat, not the police. His being in custody wouldn’t change that. In order for the police to create such a threat, they would have had to put the drugs in his anal cavity themselves.
If the police didn’t create the threat then under the rulings you pointed me to, even with a “special relationship” having been established because he was in custody, it doesn’t seem to impose a “duty to care” on the police that would override Eckert’s civil rights.
The person threatening to jump off a bridge is different for a variety of reasons, particularly because they pose an immediate threat to others (i.e. anyone under the bridge), as well as to public property. A person merely suspected of hiding drugs in their anal cavity who has already undergone two digit probes, two x-rays, and thee enemas that did not show any signs of hidden drugs is a far different sort of situation.
Also, as a side note, many insurance companies categorize colonoscopies as surgical procedures for purposes of billing, particularly because of the application of anesthesia.
Mas,
I’m sorry, but your comments there seem rather inconsistent with your previous remarks on the subject. Was the repeated searching of Eckert justified in your view because of a “duty to care”, or was it justified because of the warrant? It can’t really be both, unless you are claiming that the warrant created medical consent for any and all procedures to be performed on Eckert (which would be contrary to medical ethics).
In the previous discussion, you claimed that responsibility for the excessive behavior fell on the medical professionals who performed the procedures. Now you are saying that the police were justified because they had Eckert in custody. Which is it?
And you still haven’t answered the core question I’ve asked repeatedly: What are the limits of this “duty to care” doctrine that you are espousing? How far are the police allowed to go if they have you in custody to save your life against your wishes? Could they force feed someone who has been on a hunger strike for a long period and is facing almost certain death or severe harm to their health if it continues much longer? Could they force a blood transfusion on a Jehovah’s Witness (who has religious objections to the procedure)? Can they force CPR on a prisoner who has expressly declared a desire not to be resuscitated?
By your arguments, each and every one of these civil rights violations could be justified quite easily. In principle, they are no different from your claimed emergency of the suspected drugs Eckert was accused of hiding. The police could argue “necessity” or “competing harms” in each of those cases I described above.
The police didn’t create a threat to Eckert’s life because they suspected he had hidden drugs in his anal cavity. The mere suspicion, even if enough to get a warrant, doesn’t mean that the police created that threat. If Eckert had hidden drugs in his anal cavity, then it is Eckert who would have created the threat, not the police. His being in custody wouldn’t change that. In order for the police to create such a threat, they would have had to put the drugs in his anal cavity themselves.
If the police didn’t create the threat then under the rulings you pointed me to, even with a “special relationship” having been established because he was in custody, it doesn’t seem to impose a “duty to care” on the police that would override Eckert’s civil rights.
The person threatening to jump off a bridge is different for a variety of reasons, particularly because they pose an immediate threat to others (i.e. anyone under the bridge), as well as to public property. A person merely suspected of hiding drugs in their anal cavity who has already undergone two digit probes, two x-rays, and thee enemas that did not show any signs of hidden drugs is a far different sort of situation.
Also, as a side note, many insurance companies categorize colonoscopies as surgical procedures for purposes of billing, particularly because of the application of anesthesia.
Mas,
I’m sorry, but your comments there seem rather inconsistent with your previous remarks on the subject. Was the repeated searching of Eckert justified in your view because of a “duty to care”, or was it justified because of the warrant? It can’t really be both, unless you are claiming that the warrant created medical consent for any and all procedures to be performed on Eckert (which would be contrary to medical ethics).
In the previous discussion, you claimed that responsibility for the excessive behavior fell on the medical professionals who performed the procedures. Now you are saying that the police were justified because they had Eckert in custody. Which is it?
And you still haven’t answered the core question I’ve asked repeatedly: What are the limits of this “duty to care” doctrine that you are espousing? How far are the police allowed to go if they have you in custody to save your life against your wishes? Could they force feed someone who has been on a hunger strike for a long period and is facing almost certain death or severe harm to their health if it continues much longer? Could they force a blood transfusion on a Jehovah’s Witness (who has religious objections to the procedure)? Can they force CPR on a prisoner who has expressly declared a desire not to be resuscitated?
By your arguments, each and every one of these civil rights violations could be justified quite easily. In principle, they are no different from your claimed emergency of the suspected drugs Eckert was accused of hiding. The police could argue “necessity” or “competing harms” in each of those cases I described above.
The police didn’t create a threat to Eckert’s life because they suspected he had hidden drugs in his anal cavity. The mere suspicion, even if enough to get a warrant, doesn’t mean that the police created that threat. If Eckert had hidden drugs in his anal cavity, then it is Eckert who would have created the threat, not the police. His being in custody wouldn’t change that. In order for the police to create such a threat, they would have had to put the drugs in his anal cavity themselves.
If the police didn’t create the threat then under the rulings you pointed me to, even with a “special relationship” having been established because he was in custody, it doesn’t seem to impose a “duty to care” on the police that would override Eckert’s civil rights.
The person threatening to jump off a bridge is different for a variety of reasons, particularly because they pose an immediate threat to others (i.e. anyone under the bridge), as well as to public property. A person merely suspected of hiding drugs in their anal cavity who has already undergone two digit probes, two x-rays, and thee enemas that did not show any signs of hidden drugs is a far different sort of situation.
Also, as a side note, many insurance companies categorize colonoscopies as surgical procedures for purposes of billing, particularly because of the application of anesthesia.
Mas,
I’m sorry, but your comments there seem rather inconsistent with your previous remarks on the subject. Was the repeated searching of Eckert justified in your view because of a “duty to care”, or was it justified because of the warrant? It can’t really be both, unless you are claiming that the warrant created medical consent for any and all procedures to be performed on Eckert (which would be contrary to medical ethics).
In the previous discussion, you claimed that responsibility for the excessive behavior fell on the medical professionals who performed the procedures. Now you are saying that the police were justified because they had Eckert in custody. Which is it?
And you still haven’t answered the core question I’ve asked repeatedly: What are the limits of this “duty to care” doctrine that you are espousing? How far are the police allowed to go if they have you in custody to save your life against your wishes? Could they force feed someone who has been on a hunger strike for a long period and is facing almost certain death or severe harm to their health if it continues much longer? Could they force a blood transfusion on a Jehovah’s Witness (who has religious objections to the procedure)? Can they force CPR on a prisoner who has expressly declared a desire not to be resuscitated?
By your arguments, each and every one of these civil rights violations could be justified quite easily. In principle, they are no different from your claimed emergency of the suspected drugs Eckert was accused of hiding. The police could argue “necessity” or “competing harms” in each of those cases I described above.
The police didn’t create a threat to Eckert’s life because they suspected he had hidden drugs in his anal cavity. The mere suspicion, even if enough to get a warrant, doesn’t mean that the police created that threat. If Eckert had hidden drugs in his anal cavity, then it is Eckert who would have created the threat, not the police. His being in custody wouldn’t change that. In order for the police to create such a threat, they would have had to put the drugs in his anal cavity themselves.
If the police didn’t create the threat then under the rulings you pointed me to, even with a “special relationship” having been established because he was in custody, it doesn’t seem to impose a “duty to care” on the police that would override Eckert’s civil rights.
The person threatening to jump off a bridge is different for a variety of reasons, particularly because they pose an immediate threat to others (i.e. anyone under the bridge), as well as to public property. A person merely suspected of hiding drugs in their anal cavity who has already undergone two digit probes, two x-rays, and thee enemas that did not show any signs of hidden drugs is a far different sort of situation.
Also, as a side note, many insurance companies categorize colonoscopies as surgical procedures for purposes of billing, particularly because of the application of anesthesia.
Mas,
I’m sorry, but your comments there seem rather inconsistent with your previous remarks on the subject. Was the repeated searching of Eckert justified in your view because of a “duty to care”, or was it justified because of the warrant? It can’t really be both, unless you are claiming that the warrant created medical consent for any and all procedures to be performed on Eckert (which would be contrary to medical ethics).
In the previous discussion, you claimed that responsibility for the excessive behavior fell on the medical professionals who performed the procedures. Now you are saying that the police were justified because they had Eckert in custody. Which is it?
And you still haven’t answered the core question I’ve asked repeatedly: What are the limits of this “duty to care” doctrine that you are espousing? How far are the police allowed to go if they have you in custody to save your life against your wishes? Could they force feed someone who has been on a hunger strike for a long period and is facing almost certain death or severe harm to their health if it continues much longer? Could they force a blood transfusion on a Jehovah’s Witness (who has religious objections to the procedure)? Can they force CPR on a prisoner who has expressly declared a desire not to be resuscitated?
By your arguments, each and every one of these civil rights violations could be justified quite easily. In principle, they are no different from your claimed emergency of the suspected drugs Eckert was accused of hiding. The police could argue “necessity” or “competing harms” in each of those cases I described above.
The police didn’t create a threat to Eckert’s life because they suspected he had hidden drugs in his anal cavity. The mere suspicion, even if enough to get a warrant, doesn’t mean that the police created that threat. If Eckert had hidden drugs in his anal cavity, then it is Eckert who would have created the threat, not the police. His being in custody wouldn’t change that. In order for the police to create such a threat, they would have had to put the drugs in his anal cavity themselves.
If the police didn’t create the threat then under the rulings you pointed me to, even with a “special relationship” having been established because he was in custody, it doesn’t seem to impose a “duty to care” on the police that would override Eckert’s civil rights.
The person threatening to jump off a bridge is different for a variety of reasons, particularly because they pose an immediate threat to others (i.e. anyone under the bridge), as well as to public property. A person merely suspected of hiding drugs in their anal cavity who has already undergone two digit probes, two x-rays, and thee enemas that did not show any signs of hidden drugs is a far different sort of situation.
Also, as a side note, many insurance companies categorize colonoscopies as surgical procedures for purposes of billing, particularly because of the application of anesthesia.
Looking at the first point in your above post, Observer, you appear to be genuinely confused, so I’ll explain it AGAIN. The observations of the police at the scene generated sufficient probable cause for the judge to issue the search warrant for the simple cavity search. The man’s simply being in custody created a special relationship and a duty to care for him. As per normal police protocol, he was turned over to the medical personnel, one of whom felt he found something out of the ordinary. The docs, not the cops, took it from there.
Observer, every other point you make has already been answered and refuted. What is new is learning that YOU seem to think that when someone is about to commit suicide by jumping from a high place, YOU are more concerned about his body damaging property than you are about his life. Can’t say I’m surprised, though.
When you repeat things that have already been talked to death, you’re going in circles, and that in turn tends to make a thread circle the drain.
Looking at the first point in your above post, Observer, you appear to be genuinely confused, so I’ll explain it AGAIN. The observations of the police at the scene generated sufficient probable cause for the judge to issue the search warrant for the simple cavity search. The man’s simply being in custody created a special relationship and a duty to care for him. As per normal police protocol, he was turned over to the medical personnel, one of whom felt he found something out of the ordinary. The docs, not the cops, took it from there.
Observer, every other point you make has already been answered and refuted. What is new is learning that YOU seem to think that when someone is about to commit suicide by jumping from a high place, YOU are more concerned about his body damaging property than you are about his life. Can’t say I’m surprised, though.
When you repeat things that have already been talked to death, you’re going in circles, and that in turn tends to make a thread circle the drain.
Looking at the first point in your above post, Observer, you appear to be genuinely confused, so I’ll explain it AGAIN. The observations of the police at the scene generated sufficient probable cause for the judge to issue the search warrant for the simple cavity search. The man’s simply being in custody created a special relationship and a duty to care for him. As per normal police protocol, he was turned over to the medical personnel, one of whom felt he found something out of the ordinary. The docs, not the cops, took it from there.
Observer, every other point you make has already been answered and refuted. What is new is learning that YOU seem to think that when someone is about to commit suicide by jumping from a high place, YOU are more concerned about his body damaging property than you are about his life. Can’t say I’m surprised, though.
When you repeat things that have already been talked to death, you’re going in circles, and that in turn tends to make a thread circle the drain.
Looking at the first point in your above post, Observer, you appear to be genuinely confused, so I’ll explain it AGAIN. The observations of the police at the scene generated sufficient probable cause for the judge to issue the search warrant for the simple cavity search. The man’s simply being in custody created a special relationship and a duty to care for him. As per normal police protocol, he was turned over to the medical personnel, one of whom felt he found something out of the ordinary. The docs, not the cops, took it from there.
Observer, every other point you make has already been answered and refuted. What is new is learning that YOU seem to think that when someone is about to commit suicide by jumping from a high place, YOU are more concerned about his body damaging property than you are about his life. Can’t say I’m surprised, though.
When you repeat things that have already been talked to death, you’re going in circles, and that in turn tends to make a thread circle the drain.
Looking at the first point in your above post, Observer, you appear to be genuinely confused, so I’ll explain it AGAIN. The observations of the police at the scene generated sufficient probable cause for the judge to issue the search warrant for the simple cavity search. The man’s simply being in custody created a special relationship and a duty to care for him. As per normal police protocol, he was turned over to the medical personnel, one of whom felt he found something out of the ordinary. The docs, not the cops, took it from there.
Observer, every other point you make has already been answered and refuted. What is new is learning that YOU seem to think that when someone is about to commit suicide by jumping from a high place, YOU are more concerned about his body damaging property than you are about his life. Can’t say I’m surprised, though.
When you repeat things that have already been talked to death, you’re going in circles, and that in turn tends to make a thread circle the drain.
Mas,
Then what are the limits of that “special relationship”? How far are the police allowed to go because of the “duty to care” you claim, especially as it relates to infringing the individual’s civil rights?
You’ve claimed that the doctrine of necessity allows things that would otherwise be impermissible, but you haven’t outlined any limits for it. Based on what you wrote, a cop would be as justified forcing a blood transfusion as he would forcing a colonoscopy against a prisoner’s consent.
Based on what I read from the case that you cited (as well as the cases that were cited in that case), the “special relationship” only seems to create a “duty to care” when the police are creating the potential harm, or they are not responding to the requests for help from the individual who has been detained. Those cases do not make it a blanket requirement for police to do whatever they deem appropriate to protect the health of a person in custody.
Neither of those criteria would seem to apply in the New Mexico case. If Eckert had drugs in his anal cavity, then the potential harm would have been created by Eckert, not the police, and so the special relationship would not seem to justify their overriding his objections based on those cases. Similarly, Eckert was not requesting that the police take those steps to allegedly protect his health, so again that justification for the “duty to care” would not seem to apply.
DeShaney explicitly didn’t say that a “special relationship” automatically created a “duty to protect”. It only specified that it “may” create a duty to protect. to quote (minus internal citations): “While certain ‘special relationships’ created or assumed by the State with respect to particular individuals may give rise to an affirmative duty, enforceable through the Due Process Clause, to provide adequate protection, the affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitations which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf, through imprisonment, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty.”
In this case, the limitations that the state imposed on Eckert didn’t create his predicament, which would then create a duty to protect. The state’s limitations didn’t restrict Eckert’s ability to request or receive medical attention if he desired it, nor did they ignore or deny requests for medical care from Eckert while he was in custody. Instead, it imposed that medical attention upon him against his will, which would seem to fall outside the guidelines given in DeShaney (or the related cases).
Mas,
Then what are the limits of that “special relationship”? How far are the police allowed to go because of the “duty to care” you claim, especially as it relates to infringing the individual’s civil rights?
You’ve claimed that the doctrine of necessity allows things that would otherwise be impermissible, but you haven’t outlined any limits for it. Based on what you wrote, a cop would be as justified forcing a blood transfusion as he would forcing a colonoscopy against a prisoner’s consent.
Based on what I read from the case that you cited (as well as the cases that were cited in that case), the “special relationship” only seems to create a “duty to care” when the police are creating the potential harm, or they are not responding to the requests for help from the individual who has been detained. Those cases do not make it a blanket requirement for police to do whatever they deem appropriate to protect the health of a person in custody.
Neither of those criteria would seem to apply in the New Mexico case. If Eckert had drugs in his anal cavity, then the potential harm would have been created by Eckert, not the police, and so the special relationship would not seem to justify their overriding his objections based on those cases. Similarly, Eckert was not requesting that the police take those steps to allegedly protect his health, so again that justification for the “duty to care” would not seem to apply.
DeShaney explicitly didn’t say that a “special relationship” automatically created a “duty to protect”. It only specified that it “may” create a duty to protect. to quote (minus internal citations): “While certain ‘special relationships’ created or assumed by the State with respect to particular individuals may give rise to an affirmative duty, enforceable through the Due Process Clause, to provide adequate protection, the affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitations which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf, through imprisonment, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty.”
In this case, the limitations that the state imposed on Eckert didn’t create his predicament, which would then create a duty to protect. The state’s limitations didn’t restrict Eckert’s ability to request or receive medical attention if he desired it, nor did they ignore or deny requests for medical care from Eckert while he was in custody. Instead, it imposed that medical attention upon him against his will, which would seem to fall outside the guidelines given in DeShaney (or the related cases).
Mas,
Then what are the limits of that “special relationship”? How far are the police allowed to go because of the “duty to care” you claim, especially as it relates to infringing the individual’s civil rights?
You’ve claimed that the doctrine of necessity allows things that would otherwise be impermissible, but you haven’t outlined any limits for it. Based on what you wrote, a cop would be as justified forcing a blood transfusion as he would forcing a colonoscopy against a prisoner’s consent.
Based on what I read from the case that you cited (as well as the cases that were cited in that case), the “special relationship” only seems to create a “duty to care” when the police are creating the potential harm, or they are not responding to the requests for help from the individual who has been detained. Those cases do not make it a blanket requirement for police to do whatever they deem appropriate to protect the health of a person in custody.
Neither of those criteria would seem to apply in the New Mexico case. If Eckert had drugs in his anal cavity, then the potential harm would have been created by Eckert, not the police, and so the special relationship would not seem to justify their overriding his objections based on those cases. Similarly, Eckert was not requesting that the police take those steps to allegedly protect his health, so again that justification for the “duty to care” would not seem to apply.
DeShaney explicitly didn’t say that a “special relationship” automatically created a “duty to protect”. It only specified that it “may” create a duty to protect. to quote (minus internal citations): “While certain ‘special relationships’ created or assumed by the State with respect to particular individuals may give rise to an affirmative duty, enforceable through the Due Process Clause, to provide adequate protection, the affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitations which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf, through imprisonment, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty.”
In this case, the limitations that the state imposed on Eckert didn’t create his predicament, which would then create a duty to protect. The state’s limitations didn’t restrict Eckert’s ability to request or receive medical attention if he desired it, nor did they ignore or deny requests for medical care from Eckert while he was in custody. Instead, it imposed that medical attention upon him against his will, which would seem to fall outside the guidelines given in DeShaney (or the related cases).
Mas,
Then what are the limits of that “special relationship”? How far are the police allowed to go because of the “duty to care” you claim, especially as it relates to infringing the individual’s civil rights?
You’ve claimed that the doctrine of necessity allows things that would otherwise be impermissible, but you haven’t outlined any limits for it. Based on what you wrote, a cop would be as justified forcing a blood transfusion as he would forcing a colonoscopy against a prisoner’s consent.
Based on what I read from the case that you cited (as well as the cases that were cited in that case), the “special relationship” only seems to create a “duty to care” when the police are creating the potential harm, or they are not responding to the requests for help from the individual who has been detained. Those cases do not make it a blanket requirement for police to do whatever they deem appropriate to protect the health of a person in custody.
Neither of those criteria would seem to apply in the New Mexico case. If Eckert had drugs in his anal cavity, then the potential harm would have been created by Eckert, not the police, and so the special relationship would not seem to justify their overriding his objections based on those cases. Similarly, Eckert was not requesting that the police take those steps to allegedly protect his health, so again that justification for the “duty to care” would not seem to apply.
DeShaney explicitly didn’t say that a “special relationship” automatically created a “duty to protect”. It only specified that it “may” create a duty to protect. to quote (minus internal citations): “While certain ‘special relationships’ created or assumed by the State with respect to particular individuals may give rise to an affirmative duty, enforceable through the Due Process Clause, to provide adequate protection, the affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitations which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf, through imprisonment, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty.”
In this case, the limitations that the state imposed on Eckert didn’t create his predicament, which would then create a duty to protect. The state’s limitations didn’t restrict Eckert’s ability to request or receive medical attention if he desired it, nor did they ignore or deny requests for medical care from Eckert while he was in custody. Instead, it imposed that medical attention upon him against his will, which would seem to fall outside the guidelines given in DeShaney (or the related cases).
Mas,
Then what are the limits of that “special relationship”? How far are the police allowed to go because of the “duty to care” you claim, especially as it relates to infringing the individual’s civil rights?
You’ve claimed that the doctrine of necessity allows things that would otherwise be impermissible, but you haven’t outlined any limits for it. Based on what you wrote, a cop would be as justified forcing a blood transfusion as he would forcing a colonoscopy against a prisoner’s consent.
Based on what I read from the case that you cited (as well as the cases that were cited in that case), the “special relationship” only seems to create a “duty to care” when the police are creating the potential harm, or they are not responding to the requests for help from the individual who has been detained. Those cases do not make it a blanket requirement for police to do whatever they deem appropriate to protect the health of a person in custody.
Neither of those criteria would seem to apply in the New Mexico case. If Eckert had drugs in his anal cavity, then the potential harm would have been created by Eckert, not the police, and so the special relationship would not seem to justify their overriding his objections based on those cases. Similarly, Eckert was not requesting that the police take those steps to allegedly protect his health, so again that justification for the “duty to care” would not seem to apply.
DeShaney explicitly didn’t say that a “special relationship” automatically created a “duty to protect”. It only specified that it “may” create a duty to protect. to quote (minus internal citations): “While certain ‘special relationships’ created or assumed by the State with respect to particular individuals may give rise to an affirmative duty, enforceable through the Due Process Clause, to provide adequate protection, the affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitations which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf, through imprisonment, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty.”
In this case, the limitations that the state imposed on Eckert didn’t create his predicament, which would then create a duty to protect. The state’s limitations didn’t restrict Eckert’s ability to request or receive medical attention if he desired it, nor did they ignore or deny requests for medical care from Eckert while he was in custody. Instead, it imposed that medical attention upon him against his will, which would seem to fall outside the guidelines given in DeShaney (or the related cases).
Observer, the duty to protect an individual in custody covers a broad area, including protecting him from third parties, and even from himself. That’s why a person in custody who has given suicidal ideation indicators is routinely put on Suicide Watch, for example.
And if we find him hanging from a bedsheet in his cell that he has fashioned into a noose, we’re expected to cut him down, attempt resuscitation, and summon emergency medical professionals.
Not leave him hanging, because he hung himself of his own free will.
And, as has been repeatedly explained to you, the cops’ job when there is a medical emergency is to bring the individual to a medical center, which is exactly what was done here.
Observer, your posts indicate that you’re intelligent and well-educated, so it’s looking a lot like you’re being deliberately disingenuous in your interpretations. I very rarely lock threads here, but if memory serves, the last one that got locked was locked because a fellow doing one-on-one with me personally told my readers here that certain court decisions said one thing when they actually said the opposite.
Lying to the readers and endless loop questions that have already been answered are two things that will shut down a discussion thread on any blog or forum. This discussion appears to now be approaching both those things, and won’t be tolerated here much longer unless the direction changes.
Observer, the duty to protect an individual in custody covers a broad area, including protecting him from third parties, and even from himself. That’s why a person in custody who has given suicidal ideation indicators is routinely put on Suicide Watch, for example.
And if we find him hanging from a bedsheet in his cell that he has fashioned into a noose, we’re expected to cut him down, attempt resuscitation, and summon emergency medical professionals.
Not leave him hanging, because he hung himself of his own free will.
And, as has been repeatedly explained to you, the cops’ job when there is a medical emergency is to bring the individual to a medical center, which is exactly what was done here.
Observer, your posts indicate that you’re intelligent and well-educated, so it’s looking a lot like you’re being deliberately disingenuous in your interpretations. I very rarely lock threads here, but if memory serves, the last one that got locked was locked because a fellow doing one-on-one with me personally told my readers here that certain court decisions said one thing when they actually said the opposite.
Lying to the readers and endless loop questions that have already been answered are two things that will shut down a discussion thread on any blog or forum. This discussion appears to now be approaching both those things, and won’t be tolerated here much longer unless the direction changes.
Observer, the duty to protect an individual in custody covers a broad area, including protecting him from third parties, and even from himself. That’s why a person in custody who has given suicidal ideation indicators is routinely put on Suicide Watch, for example.
And if we find him hanging from a bedsheet in his cell that he has fashioned into a noose, we’re expected to cut him down, attempt resuscitation, and summon emergency medical professionals.
Not leave him hanging, because he hung himself of his own free will.
And, as has been repeatedly explained to you, the cops’ job when there is a medical emergency is to bring the individual to a medical center, which is exactly what was done here.
Observer, your posts indicate that you’re intelligent and well-educated, so it’s looking a lot like you’re being deliberately disingenuous in your interpretations. I very rarely lock threads here, but if memory serves, the last one that got locked was locked because a fellow doing one-on-one with me personally told my readers here that certain court decisions said one thing when they actually said the opposite.
Lying to the readers and endless loop questions that have already been answered are two things that will shut down a discussion thread on any blog or forum. This discussion appears to now be approaching both those things, and won’t be tolerated here much longer unless the direction changes.
Observer, the duty to protect an individual in custody covers a broad area, including protecting him from third parties, and even from himself. That’s why a person in custody who has given suicidal ideation indicators is routinely put on Suicide Watch, for example.
And if we find him hanging from a bedsheet in his cell that he has fashioned into a noose, we’re expected to cut him down, attempt resuscitation, and summon emergency medical professionals.
Not leave him hanging, because he hung himself of his own free will.
And, as has been repeatedly explained to you, the cops’ job when there is a medical emergency is to bring the individual to a medical center, which is exactly what was done here.
Observer, your posts indicate that you’re intelligent and well-educated, so it’s looking a lot like you’re being deliberately disingenuous in your interpretations. I very rarely lock threads here, but if memory serves, the last one that got locked was locked because a fellow doing one-on-one with me personally told my readers here that certain court decisions said one thing when they actually said the opposite.
Lying to the readers and endless loop questions that have already been answered are two things that will shut down a discussion thread on any blog or forum. This discussion appears to now be approaching both those things, and won’t be tolerated here much longer unless the direction changes.
Observer, the duty to protect an individual in custody covers a broad area, including protecting him from third parties, and even from himself. That’s why a person in custody who has given suicidal ideation indicators is routinely put on Suicide Watch, for example.
And if we find him hanging from a bedsheet in his cell that he has fashioned into a noose, we’re expected to cut him down, attempt resuscitation, and summon emergency medical professionals.
Not leave him hanging, because he hung himself of his own free will.
And, as has been repeatedly explained to you, the cops’ job when there is a medical emergency is to bring the individual to a medical center, which is exactly what was done here.
Observer, your posts indicate that you’re intelligent and well-educated, so it’s looking a lot like you’re being deliberately disingenuous in your interpretations. I very rarely lock threads here, but if memory serves, the last one that got locked was locked because a fellow doing one-on-one with me personally told my readers here that certain court decisions said one thing when they actually said the opposite.
Lying to the readers and endless loop questions that have already been answered are two things that will shut down a discussion thread on any blog or forum. This discussion appears to now be approaching both those things, and won’t be tolerated here much longer unless the direction changes.
Mas, you wrote:
“I very rarely lock threads here, but if memory serves, the last one that got locked was locked because a fellow doing one-on-one with me personally told my readers here that certain court decisions said one thing when they actually said the opposite.”
Sorry, Mas, you are mistaken. I remember that thread. You were the one who was cherry-picking quotes from court cases and taking them out of context. You tried to sell us a bill of goods, someone called you on it, then you locked the thread after a last parting shot. You took your ball and ran home.
I read the thread, and the cited cases in their entirety. I encourage everyone to do the same. The thread can be found here:
https://backwoodshome.com/blogs/MassadAyoob/2013/11/11/understanding-both-sides-2/#comments
Mas, you wrote:
“I very rarely lock threads here, but if memory serves, the last one that got locked was locked because a fellow doing one-on-one with me personally told my readers here that certain court decisions said one thing when they actually said the opposite.”
Sorry, Mas, you are mistaken. I remember that thread. You were the one who was cherry-picking quotes from court cases and taking them out of context. You tried to sell us a bill of goods, someone called you on it, then you locked the thread after a last parting shot. You took your ball and ran home.
I read the thread, and the cited cases in their entirety. I encourage everyone to do the same. The thread can be found here:
https://backwoodshome.com/blogs/MassadAyoob/2013/11/11/understanding-both-sides-2/#comments
Mas, you wrote:
“I very rarely lock threads here, but if memory serves, the last one that got locked was locked because a fellow doing one-on-one with me personally told my readers here that certain court decisions said one thing when they actually said the opposite.”
Sorry, Mas, you are mistaken. I remember that thread. You were the one who was cherry-picking quotes from court cases and taking them out of context. You tried to sell us a bill of goods, someone called you on it, then you locked the thread after a last parting shot. You took your ball and ran home.
I read the thread, and the cited cases in their entirety. I encourage everyone to do the same. The thread can be found here:
https://backwoodshome.com/blogs/MassadAyoob/2013/11/11/understanding-both-sides-2/#comments
Mas, you wrote:
“I very rarely lock threads here, but if memory serves, the last one that got locked was locked because a fellow doing one-on-one with me personally told my readers here that certain court decisions said one thing when they actually said the opposite.”
Sorry, Mas, you are mistaken. I remember that thread. You were the one who was cherry-picking quotes from court cases and taking them out of context. You tried to sell us a bill of goods, someone called you on it, then you locked the thread after a last parting shot. You took your ball and ran home.
I read the thread, and the cited cases in their entirety. I encourage everyone to do the same. The thread can be found here:
https://backwoodshome.com/blogs/MassadAyoob/2013/11/11/understanding-both-sides-2/#comments
Mas, you wrote:
“I very rarely lock threads here, but if memory serves, the last one that got locked was locked because a fellow doing one-on-one with me personally told my readers here that certain court decisions said one thing when they actually said the opposite.”
Sorry, Mas, you are mistaken. I remember that thread. You were the one who was cherry-picking quotes from court cases and taking them out of context. You tried to sell us a bill of goods, someone called you on it, then you locked the thread after a last parting shot. You took your ball and ran home.
I read the thread, and the cited cases in their entirety. I encourage everyone to do the same. The thread can be found here:
https://backwoodshome.com/blogs/MassadAyoob/2013/11/11/understanding-both-sides-2/#comments
Mas,
Is there not a difference between a requirement to take a prisoner to a medical facility (where they are still free to direct their own medical care), and demanding that certain medical services are performed on them against their consent, even with a search warrant. A search warrant is issued for purposes of gathering evidence, not for the purpose of forcing a potentially life-saving procedure upon someone. (That can be done, but it is usually done via different type of court order.)
Yes, police are required to cut down a suicidal prisoner who has hung himself. However, last I checked, police aren’t allowed to force life-saving treatment on a dying prisoner without that prisoner’s consent (unless the prisoner has been adjudicated incompetent). For example, prison officials cannot force a cancer-stricken prisoner to undergo chemo or surgery to remove the cancer, nor force a prisoner to undergo an organ transplant. The Eckert case is far closer to the latter than the former.
Consider it this way: the initial reason for taking Eckert into custody was to perform the search (including of his anal cavity) authorized by the search warrant. Once that purpose was fulfilled, did not the police have an obligation to release him from custody unless they were charging him with a crime?
On that basis, the initial procedures (x-rays, digit probes, enemas) fulfilled the purpose of the search warrant. The only justifications for the colonoscopy would be if 1) it was covered by the search warrant, 2) it was medically necessary and demanded by the police because of their “special relationship” with Eckert, or 3) it was medically necessary and Eckert consented. Because Eckert did not consent, 3) does not apply. If the colonoscopy was justified under 1), then we get into questions of whether the warrant was valid in the time and place that the search was carried out. That’s really outside of the discussion that we are having here.
That leaves scenario 2). If the purposes of the warrant were already fulfilled by the initial procedures, and the police had not received enough evidence to charge Eckert with a crime (as shown by the fact that they didn’t charge him with any crimes even after the colonoscopy), then why didn’t the “special relationship” end and they release Eckert from custody prior to the non-consensual colonoscopy?
The one limit that I have found in reading through the court cases already mentioned (as well as other articles today that reference those cases) is the “reasonable man” standard. In the same circumstances, would a reasonable man believe that an affirmative duty to protect would apply.
The problem here is that in order to apply a “duty to protect”, a reasonable person would have to believe that there was a distinct threat to him at the time. Considering that the doctors had already performed multiple procedures (x-rays, digit probes, enemas) on him without finding evidence of a threat, and we’ve already established that medical ethics does not allow doctors to treat patients without consent, I have to question how reasonable the assumption that the colonoscopy was needed would be. Even if an initial search proved reasonable, each successive examination would become less so, as the lack of evidence would make the possibility of the danger less and less.
As a result, I would have to conclude that, without additional evidence, the actions in the Eckert case were not reasonable and fell outside an affirmative duty to protect him. We cannot simply assume that the cops’ actions were reasonable because they were cops.
Mas,
Is there not a difference between a requirement to take a prisoner to a medical facility (where they are still free to direct their own medical care), and demanding that certain medical services are performed on them against their consent, even with a search warrant. A search warrant is issued for purposes of gathering evidence, not for the purpose of forcing a potentially life-saving procedure upon someone. (That can be done, but it is usually done via different type of court order.)
Yes, police are required to cut down a suicidal prisoner who has hung himself. However, last I checked, police aren’t allowed to force life-saving treatment on a dying prisoner without that prisoner’s consent (unless the prisoner has been adjudicated incompetent). For example, prison officials cannot force a cancer-stricken prisoner to undergo chemo or surgery to remove the cancer, nor force a prisoner to undergo an organ transplant. The Eckert case is far closer to the latter than the former.
Consider it this way: the initial reason for taking Eckert into custody was to perform the search (including of his anal cavity) authorized by the search warrant. Once that purpose was fulfilled, did not the police have an obligation to release him from custody unless they were charging him with a crime?
On that basis, the initial procedures (x-rays, digit probes, enemas) fulfilled the purpose of the search warrant. The only justifications for the colonoscopy would be if 1) it was covered by the search warrant, 2) it was medically necessary and demanded by the police because of their “special relationship” with Eckert, or 3) it was medically necessary and Eckert consented. Because Eckert did not consent, 3) does not apply. If the colonoscopy was justified under 1), then we get into questions of whether the warrant was valid in the time and place that the search was carried out. That’s really outside of the discussion that we are having here.
That leaves scenario 2). If the purposes of the warrant were already fulfilled by the initial procedures, and the police had not received enough evidence to charge Eckert with a crime (as shown by the fact that they didn’t charge him with any crimes even after the colonoscopy), then why didn’t the “special relationship” end and they release Eckert from custody prior to the non-consensual colonoscopy?
The one limit that I have found in reading through the court cases already mentioned (as well as other articles today that reference those cases) is the “reasonable man” standard. In the same circumstances, would a reasonable man believe that an affirmative duty to protect would apply.
The problem here is that in order to apply a “duty to protect”, a reasonable person would have to believe that there was a distinct threat to him at the time. Considering that the doctors had already performed multiple procedures (x-rays, digit probes, enemas) on him without finding evidence of a threat, and we’ve already established that medical ethics does not allow doctors to treat patients without consent, I have to question how reasonable the assumption that the colonoscopy was needed would be. Even if an initial search proved reasonable, each successive examination would become less so, as the lack of evidence would make the possibility of the danger less and less.
As a result, I would have to conclude that, without additional evidence, the actions in the Eckert case were not reasonable and fell outside an affirmative duty to protect him. We cannot simply assume that the cops’ actions were reasonable because they were cops.
Mas,
Is there not a difference between a requirement to take a prisoner to a medical facility (where they are still free to direct their own medical care), and demanding that certain medical services are performed on them against their consent, even with a search warrant. A search warrant is issued for purposes of gathering evidence, not for the purpose of forcing a potentially life-saving procedure upon someone. (That can be done, but it is usually done via different type of court order.)
Yes, police are required to cut down a suicidal prisoner who has hung himself. However, last I checked, police aren’t allowed to force life-saving treatment on a dying prisoner without that prisoner’s consent (unless the prisoner has been adjudicated incompetent). For example, prison officials cannot force a cancer-stricken prisoner to undergo chemo or surgery to remove the cancer, nor force a prisoner to undergo an organ transplant. The Eckert case is far closer to the latter than the former.
Consider it this way: the initial reason for taking Eckert into custody was to perform the search (including of his anal cavity) authorized by the search warrant. Once that purpose was fulfilled, did not the police have an obligation to release him from custody unless they were charging him with a crime?
On that basis, the initial procedures (x-rays, digit probes, enemas) fulfilled the purpose of the search warrant. The only justifications for the colonoscopy would be if 1) it was covered by the search warrant, 2) it was medically necessary and demanded by the police because of their “special relationship” with Eckert, or 3) it was medically necessary and Eckert consented. Because Eckert did not consent, 3) does not apply. If the colonoscopy was justified under 1), then we get into questions of whether the warrant was valid in the time and place that the search was carried out. That’s really outside of the discussion that we are having here.
That leaves scenario 2). If the purposes of the warrant were already fulfilled by the initial procedures, and the police had not received enough evidence to charge Eckert with a crime (as shown by the fact that they didn’t charge him with any crimes even after the colonoscopy), then why didn’t the “special relationship” end and they release Eckert from custody prior to the non-consensual colonoscopy?
The one limit that I have found in reading through the court cases already mentioned (as well as other articles today that reference those cases) is the “reasonable man” standard. In the same circumstances, would a reasonable man believe that an affirmative duty to protect would apply.
The problem here is that in order to apply a “duty to protect”, a reasonable person would have to believe that there was a distinct threat to him at the time. Considering that the doctors had already performed multiple procedures (x-rays, digit probes, enemas) on him without finding evidence of a threat, and we’ve already established that medical ethics does not allow doctors to treat patients without consent, I have to question how reasonable the assumption that the colonoscopy was needed would be. Even if an initial search proved reasonable, each successive examination would become less so, as the lack of evidence would make the possibility of the danger less and less.
As a result, I would have to conclude that, without additional evidence, the actions in the Eckert case were not reasonable and fell outside an affirmative duty to protect him. We cannot simply assume that the cops’ actions were reasonable because they were cops.
Mas,
Is there not a difference between a requirement to take a prisoner to a medical facility (where they are still free to direct their own medical care), and demanding that certain medical services are performed on them against their consent, even with a search warrant. A search warrant is issued for purposes of gathering evidence, not for the purpose of forcing a potentially life-saving procedure upon someone. (That can be done, but it is usually done via different type of court order.)
Yes, police are required to cut down a suicidal prisoner who has hung himself. However, last I checked, police aren’t allowed to force life-saving treatment on a dying prisoner without that prisoner’s consent (unless the prisoner has been adjudicated incompetent). For example, prison officials cannot force a cancer-stricken prisoner to undergo chemo or surgery to remove the cancer, nor force a prisoner to undergo an organ transplant. The Eckert case is far closer to the latter than the former.
Consider it this way: the initial reason for taking Eckert into custody was to perform the search (including of his anal cavity) authorized by the search warrant. Once that purpose was fulfilled, did not the police have an obligation to release him from custody unless they were charging him with a crime?
On that basis, the initial procedures (x-rays, digit probes, enemas) fulfilled the purpose of the search warrant. The only justifications for the colonoscopy would be if 1) it was covered by the search warrant, 2) it was medically necessary and demanded by the police because of their “special relationship” with Eckert, or 3) it was medically necessary and Eckert consented. Because Eckert did not consent, 3) does not apply. If the colonoscopy was justified under 1), then we get into questions of whether the warrant was valid in the time and place that the search was carried out. That’s really outside of the discussion that we are having here.
That leaves scenario 2). If the purposes of the warrant were already fulfilled by the initial procedures, and the police had not received enough evidence to charge Eckert with a crime (as shown by the fact that they didn’t charge him with any crimes even after the colonoscopy), then why didn’t the “special relationship” end and they release Eckert from custody prior to the non-consensual colonoscopy?
The one limit that I have found in reading through the court cases already mentioned (as well as other articles today that reference those cases) is the “reasonable man” standard. In the same circumstances, would a reasonable man believe that an affirmative duty to protect would apply.
The problem here is that in order to apply a “duty to protect”, a reasonable person would have to believe that there was a distinct threat to him at the time. Considering that the doctors had already performed multiple procedures (x-rays, digit probes, enemas) on him without finding evidence of a threat, and we’ve already established that medical ethics does not allow doctors to treat patients without consent, I have to question how reasonable the assumption that the colonoscopy was needed would be. Even if an initial search proved reasonable, each successive examination would become less so, as the lack of evidence would make the possibility of the danger less and less.
As a result, I would have to conclude that, without additional evidence, the actions in the Eckert case were not reasonable and fell outside an affirmative duty to protect him. We cannot simply assume that the cops’ actions were reasonable because they were cops.
Mas,
Is there not a difference between a requirement to take a prisoner to a medical facility (where they are still free to direct their own medical care), and demanding that certain medical services are performed on them against their consent, even with a search warrant. A search warrant is issued for purposes of gathering evidence, not for the purpose of forcing a potentially life-saving procedure upon someone. (That can be done, but it is usually done via different type of court order.)
Yes, police are required to cut down a suicidal prisoner who has hung himself. However, last I checked, police aren’t allowed to force life-saving treatment on a dying prisoner without that prisoner’s consent (unless the prisoner has been adjudicated incompetent). For example, prison officials cannot force a cancer-stricken prisoner to undergo chemo or surgery to remove the cancer, nor force a prisoner to undergo an organ transplant. The Eckert case is far closer to the latter than the former.
Consider it this way: the initial reason for taking Eckert into custody was to perform the search (including of his anal cavity) authorized by the search warrant. Once that purpose was fulfilled, did not the police have an obligation to release him from custody unless they were charging him with a crime?
On that basis, the initial procedures (x-rays, digit probes, enemas) fulfilled the purpose of the search warrant. The only justifications for the colonoscopy would be if 1) it was covered by the search warrant, 2) it was medically necessary and demanded by the police because of their “special relationship” with Eckert, or 3) it was medically necessary and Eckert consented. Because Eckert did not consent, 3) does not apply. If the colonoscopy was justified under 1), then we get into questions of whether the warrant was valid in the time and place that the search was carried out. That’s really outside of the discussion that we are having here.
That leaves scenario 2). If the purposes of the warrant were already fulfilled by the initial procedures, and the police had not received enough evidence to charge Eckert with a crime (as shown by the fact that they didn’t charge him with any crimes even after the colonoscopy), then why didn’t the “special relationship” end and they release Eckert from custody prior to the non-consensual colonoscopy?
The one limit that I have found in reading through the court cases already mentioned (as well as other articles today that reference those cases) is the “reasonable man” standard. In the same circumstances, would a reasonable man believe that an affirmative duty to protect would apply.
The problem here is that in order to apply a “duty to protect”, a reasonable person would have to believe that there was a distinct threat to him at the time. Considering that the doctors had already performed multiple procedures (x-rays, digit probes, enemas) on him without finding evidence of a threat, and we’ve already established that medical ethics does not allow doctors to treat patients without consent, I have to question how reasonable the assumption that the colonoscopy was needed would be. Even if an initial search proved reasonable, each successive examination would become less so, as the lack of evidence would make the possibility of the danger less and less.
As a result, I would have to conclude that, without additional evidence, the actions in the Eckert case were not reasonable and fell outside an affirmative duty to protect him. We cannot simply assume that the cops’ actions were reasonable because they were cops.
Mas,
I do want to add that I have found this discussion to be very educational. Thank you for pointing me in the direction of some good information. While we disagree, I do have a lot of respect for you and your opinions, which is a large part of why I have found your comments towards me to be so frustrating.
For other people’s reference, some of the articles that I found helpful:
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=341&issue_id=72004
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1172&issue_id=52007
http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2010/06/liability-for-failure-to-protect.aspx
Mas,
I do want to add that I have found this discussion to be very educational. Thank you for pointing me in the direction of some good information. While we disagree, I do have a lot of respect for you and your opinions, which is a large part of why I have found your comments towards me to be so frustrating.
For other people’s reference, some of the articles that I found helpful:
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=341&issue_id=72004
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1172&issue_id=52007
http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2010/06/liability-for-failure-to-protect.aspx
Mas,
I do want to add that I have found this discussion to be very educational. Thank you for pointing me in the direction of some good information. While we disagree, I do have a lot of respect for you and your opinions, which is a large part of why I have found your comments towards me to be so frustrating.
For other people’s reference, some of the articles that I found helpful:
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=341&issue_id=72004
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1172&issue_id=52007
http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2010/06/liability-for-failure-to-protect.aspx
Mas,
I do want to add that I have found this discussion to be very educational. Thank you for pointing me in the direction of some good information. While we disagree, I do have a lot of respect for you and your opinions, which is a large part of why I have found your comments towards me to be so frustrating.
For other people’s reference, some of the articles that I found helpful:
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=341&issue_id=72004
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1172&issue_id=52007
http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2010/06/liability-for-failure-to-protect.aspx
Mas,
I do want to add that I have found this discussion to be very educational. Thank you for pointing me in the direction of some good information. While we disagree, I do have a lot of respect for you and your opinions, which is a large part of why I have found your comments towards me to be so frustrating.
For other people’s reference, some of the articles that I found helpful:
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=341&issue_id=72004
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1172&issue_id=52007
http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2010/06/liability-for-failure-to-protect.aspx
Mas, this might help you understand one of your antagonist, and comparing styles, I would not be surprised if two of them may be the same person.
https://web.elastic.org/~fche/podium.shtml
After a little searching, it becomes apparent that his MO is to go to numerous web sites/blogs, always, without exception, taking an antagonistic position to that of the author of the blog. It appears that he feeds on the argument more than the seeking of answers or civil dialogue. These blog sites cover a myriad of subjects from political to technical and social. By his own admission, on the above link, acknowledges that he is an “egoist”.
I’m fairly new to this internet stuff. Is this not the definition of a troll?
Mas, this might help you understand one of your antagonist, and comparing styles, I would not be surprised if two of them may be the same person.
https://web.elastic.org/~fche/podium.shtml
After a little searching, it becomes apparent that his MO is to go to numerous web sites/blogs, always, without exception, taking an antagonistic position to that of the author of the blog. It appears that he feeds on the argument more than the seeking of answers or civil dialogue. These blog sites cover a myriad of subjects from political to technical and social. By his own admission, on the above link, acknowledges that he is an “egoist”.
I’m fairly new to this internet stuff. Is this not the definition of a troll?
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