A comment on this blog doesn’t usually turn into a blog entry, but it happens. Kinda like, as follows.
Someone who goes by “s” posted this as a comment to the last blog entry here:
Once again, Ayoob lies and creates evidence from thin air when it suits him. In his pathetic apology for the anal rape and torture of man, Ayoob conjured up a “duty of care” (to rape a man!) with zero evidence. Now he lies that members urged JPFO to die rather than accept the SAF takeover. Bullshit. I repeat: bullshit.
There were several parties who attempted to contact the JPFO board. They had alternatives and funding to back up their plans. The tiny August shortfall (roughly $1000) was easily covered; they people had 5-figure sums ready and waiting to be put to use. Ayoob dismisses these attempts at constructive engagement as “vitriol,” and any alternative to a takeover by the organization he represents as “clamored for JPFO to “die with dignity.”
Like the anal rape case, Ayoob creates a new reason that had never before been mentioned. Now his self-interested position as an SAF board member is to preserve the JPFO literature.The more likely outcome is that Gottlieb and his lackeys will suppress and attempt to shove the more strident JPFO work down the memory hole. It’s too uncompromising, too principled, too harsh.That attempt will fail. Neither Gottlieb or his lackey Ayoob can understand what has happened, and what will happen. The materials have already been preserved, by the people SAF and Ayoob love to hate. Watch for SAF attempts to suppress them via claims of copyright infringement. If there was any merit to Ayoob’s testilying, SAF would welcome all attempts to publicsize Zelman’s legacy. But since the truth is that the only prize is the JPFO mail lists, more grists for the for-profit Gottlieb mass mailing machine, that will never happen.
“s,” I will respond to your rant point by point, in order.
You started with the New Mexico case awhile back where you and others accused cops and docs of rape when police transported to a medical center a man they believed had stashed drugs up his butt. I pointed out that anyone who works a patrol car OR an emergency room knows of people who’ve died from doing that. The cops brought him in, the docs did the colonoscopy, and I said we should wait to hear from the cops and the docs themselves why they made the decisions they did. All these months later, those answers still have not come out. I won’t make a judgment until they do. You, and those like you, are perfectly ready to form a lynch mob after hearing only one side of the story. I’m not, and I won’t apologize for that.
“s,” you write, “Now he (Ayoob) lies that members urged JPFO to die rather than accept the SAF takeover. Bullshit. I repeat: bullshit.”
The BS is on your end, “s.” I don’t know whether you deliberately lied, or whether you simply spoke from ignorance, but consider the following:
MamaLiberty, 9/1/14, at Claire Wolfe’s blog “1016” comments: “Nothing is forever, obviously. Seems to me an honorable death of the organization is preferable to what may become of it now… but we were not given a choice in the matter.”
J. Eric Andreasen, 8/22/14, at Claire’s original blog entry on the topic, comments: “Claire, this is simply horrifying. Gottlieb is a KAPO, plain and simple. Better to burn JPFO to the ground and start anew.”
On the same day in the same blog, Claire herself commented: “Kapo. Eric, that’s sad. But true. I tend to agree JPFO would be better off gone than turned into an SAF zombie.”
“Kapo.” A term for Jews who were suborned by the Nazis and led other Jews into the death chambers. A supreme insult to any Jew, particularly the one who just saved Jews for Preservation of Firearms Ownership from oblivion. And your folks don’t spew vitriol, huh, “s”? You say I’m wrong for imputing vitriol, yet in your own post you spew words like “lies,” “evidence from thin air,” “bullshit,” “lackeys,” and “testilying.” Can you spell i-r-o-n-y? Or, h-y-p-o-c-r-i-s-y?
The record shows that JPFO came to SAF, not vice versa. I think the coming months will see JPFO and its message stronger and more widely known than before…no thanks to you and those who think like you. SAF will spread JPFO’s core message and research to a public that desperately needs to hear it, while you’re still hiding behind your cowardly internet anonymity, spewing your venom at people who’ve done more for gun owners’ civil rights than you ever have or will.
Mas, this might help you understand one of your antagonist, and comparing styles, I would not be surprised if two of them may be the same person.
https://web.elastic.org/~fche/podium.shtml
After a little searching, it becomes apparent that his MO is to go to numerous web sites/blogs, always, without exception, taking an antagonistic position to that of the author of the blog. It appears that he feeds on the argument more than the seeking of answers or civil dialogue. These blog sites cover a myriad of subjects from political to technical and social. By his own admission, on the above link, acknowledges that he is an “egoist”.
I’m fairly new to this internet stuff. Is this not the definition of a troll?
Mas, this might help you understand one of your antagonist, and comparing styles, I would not be surprised if two of them may be the same person.
https://web.elastic.org/~fche/podium.shtml
After a little searching, it becomes apparent that his MO is to go to numerous web sites/blogs, always, without exception, taking an antagonistic position to that of the author of the blog. It appears that he feeds on the argument more than the seeking of answers or civil dialogue. These blog sites cover a myriad of subjects from political to technical and social. By his own admission, on the above link, acknowledges that he is an “egoist”.
I’m fairly new to this internet stuff. Is this not the definition of a troll?
Mas, this might help you understand one of your antagonist, and comparing styles, I would not be surprised if two of them may be the same person.
https://web.elastic.org/~fche/podium.shtml
After a little searching, it becomes apparent that his MO is to go to numerous web sites/blogs, always, without exception, taking an antagonistic position to that of the author of the blog. It appears that he feeds on the argument more than the seeking of answers or civil dialogue. These blog sites cover a myriad of subjects from political to technical and social. By his own admission, on the above link, acknowledges that he is an “egoist”.
I’m fairly new to this internet stuff. Is this not the definition of a troll?
Will, welcome to the blog. Dissenting opinions are welcome here, but should be well-researched. I think you need to read those cases again, in detail. If I took my ball and ran home because I was proven wrong, as you allege, why would I have left those comments and cases up and archived and readily available?
Observer, my point is that the officers had sufficient probable cause to believe the guy had dangerous drugs up his butt that a judge issued the search warrant. When medical personnel initially believed there was something in there they couldn’t explain — a point at which it was already in the docs’ ballpark, not the cops’ — they had more probable cause to assume a life-threatening situation, and I for one can understand why they continued the examination and went so far as to do the colonoscopy.
We do indeed differ in our opinions. To me, the hinge point is whether or not the cops (and docs) were concerned that a container of potentially lethal drugs could rupture inside this guy’s body and kill him at any moment. Because of the settlement I suspect, details of what was going through the minds of both the officers and the doctors is apparently not yet in public domain, and my position remains this: unless and until we know those things, we are not in a position to judge.
Your hypothesis of the potentially terminal cancer patient forced to take chemo or radiation differs severely from that which the officers faced in the Deming case, the critical difference being time factor. In the Eckert case, if the man had indeed “keestered” enough drugs to kill him at any moment, time was of the essence. Hence, the “exigent circumstances” factor.
Observer, thank you for your links showing that police do indeed have a duty of care in regard to those in their custody. If you had found them on the 15th instead of the 17th, it might have saved some acrimony and time here. That said, though, I respect your posting links that supported my position on that matter.
Will, welcome to the blog. Dissenting opinions are welcome here, but should be well-researched. I think you need to read those cases again, in detail. If I took my ball and ran home because I was proven wrong, as you allege, why would I have left those comments and cases up and archived and readily available?
Observer, my point is that the officers had sufficient probable cause to believe the guy had dangerous drugs up his butt that a judge issued the search warrant. When medical personnel initially believed there was something in there they couldn’t explain — a point at which it was already in the docs’ ballpark, not the cops’ — they had more probable cause to assume a life-threatening situation, and I for one can understand why they continued the examination and went so far as to do the colonoscopy.
We do indeed differ in our opinions. To me, the hinge point is whether or not the cops (and docs) were concerned that a container of potentially lethal drugs could rupture inside this guy’s body and kill him at any moment. Because of the settlement I suspect, details of what was going through the minds of both the officers and the doctors is apparently not yet in public domain, and my position remains this: unless and until we know those things, we are not in a position to judge.
Your hypothesis of the potentially terminal cancer patient forced to take chemo or radiation differs severely from that which the officers faced in the Deming case, the critical difference being time factor. In the Eckert case, if the man had indeed “keestered” enough drugs to kill him at any moment, time was of the essence. Hence, the “exigent circumstances” factor.
Observer, thank you for your links showing that police do indeed have a duty of care in regard to those in their custody. If you had found them on the 15th instead of the 17th, it might have saved some acrimony and time here. That said, though, I respect your posting links that supported my position on that matter.
Will, welcome to the blog. Dissenting opinions are welcome here, but should be well-researched. I think you need to read those cases again, in detail. If I took my ball and ran home because I was proven wrong, as you allege, why would I have left those comments and cases up and archived and readily available?
Observer, my point is that the officers had sufficient probable cause to believe the guy had dangerous drugs up his butt that a judge issued the search warrant. When medical personnel initially believed there was something in there they couldn’t explain — a point at which it was already in the docs’ ballpark, not the cops’ — they had more probable cause to assume a life-threatening situation, and I for one can understand why they continued the examination and went so far as to do the colonoscopy.
We do indeed differ in our opinions. To me, the hinge point is whether or not the cops (and docs) were concerned that a container of potentially lethal drugs could rupture inside this guy’s body and kill him at any moment. Because of the settlement I suspect, details of what was going through the minds of both the officers and the doctors is apparently not yet in public domain, and my position remains this: unless and until we know those things, we are not in a position to judge.
Your hypothesis of the potentially terminal cancer patient forced to take chemo or radiation differs severely from that which the officers faced in the Deming case, the critical difference being time factor. In the Eckert case, if the man had indeed “keestered” enough drugs to kill him at any moment, time was of the essence. Hence, the “exigent circumstances” factor.
Observer, thank you for your links showing that police do indeed have a duty of care in regard to those in their custody. If you had found them on the 15th instead of the 17th, it might have saved some acrimony and time here. That said, though, I respect your posting links that supported my position on that matter.
Will, welcome to the blog. Dissenting opinions are welcome here, but should be well-researched. I think you need to read those cases again, in detail. If I took my ball and ran home because I was proven wrong, as you allege, why would I have left those comments and cases up and archived and readily available?
Observer, my point is that the officers had sufficient probable cause to believe the guy had dangerous drugs up his butt that a judge issued the search warrant. When medical personnel initially believed there was something in there they couldn’t explain — a point at which it was already in the docs’ ballpark, not the cops’ — they had more probable cause to assume a life-threatening situation, and I for one can understand why they continued the examination and went so far as to do the colonoscopy.
We do indeed differ in our opinions. To me, the hinge point is whether or not the cops (and docs) were concerned that a container of potentially lethal drugs could rupture inside this guy’s body and kill him at any moment. Because of the settlement I suspect, details of what was going through the minds of both the officers and the doctors is apparently not yet in public domain, and my position remains this: unless and until we know those things, we are not in a position to judge.
Your hypothesis of the potentially terminal cancer patient forced to take chemo or radiation differs severely from that which the officers faced in the Deming case, the critical difference being time factor. In the Eckert case, if the man had indeed “keestered” enough drugs to kill him at any moment, time was of the essence. Hence, the “exigent circumstances” factor.
Observer, thank you for your links showing that police do indeed have a duty of care in regard to those in their custody. If you had found them on the 15th instead of the 17th, it might have saved some acrimony and time here. That said, though, I respect your posting links that supported my position on that matter.
Will, welcome to the blog. Dissenting opinions are welcome here, but should be well-researched. I think you need to read those cases again, in detail. If I took my ball and ran home because I was proven wrong, as you allege, why would I have left those comments and cases up and archived and readily available?
Observer, my point is that the officers had sufficient probable cause to believe the guy had dangerous drugs up his butt that a judge issued the search warrant. When medical personnel initially believed there was something in there they couldn’t explain — a point at which it was already in the docs’ ballpark, not the cops’ — they had more probable cause to assume a life-threatening situation, and I for one can understand why they continued the examination and went so far as to do the colonoscopy.
We do indeed differ in our opinions. To me, the hinge point is whether or not the cops (and docs) were concerned that a container of potentially lethal drugs could rupture inside this guy’s body and kill him at any moment. Because of the settlement I suspect, details of what was going through the minds of both the officers and the doctors is apparently not yet in public domain, and my position remains this: unless and until we know those things, we are not in a position to judge.
Your hypothesis of the potentially terminal cancer patient forced to take chemo or radiation differs severely from that which the officers faced in the Deming case, the critical difference being time factor. In the Eckert case, if the man had indeed “keestered” enough drugs to kill him at any moment, time was of the essence. Hence, the “exigent circumstances” factor.
Observer, thank you for your links showing that police do indeed have a duty of care in regard to those in their custody. If you had found them on the 15th instead of the 17th, it might have saved some acrimony and time here. That said, though, I respect your posting links that supported my position on that matter.
Mas,
I’m sorry, but you seem to be taking part of what I said there out of context. Those articles provide some background, but they don’t match up with what you are claiming.
If you read those links, they discuss some of the limitations of the “duty to protect”, and it doesn’t appear to be as cut-and-dried as you are suggesting. The existence of a “special relationship” does not give the police license to do whatever they deem appropriate to protect the life of a person in custody. It is limited by several principles that you don’t seem to be recognizing in your comments.
The “special relationship” imposes an affirmative duty to protect only to such a degree as the government actor has limited the individual’s liberty to protect themselves, or to the extent that the government actor(s) created the danger.
To use a personal hypothetical, I am allergic to bees. If a police officer disarms me and handcuffs me, he is responsible to make sure that someone else doesn’t come along and beat me up or kill me. But, if I get stung by a bee and have an allergic reaction while I am handcuffed, and I refuse to accept an epi pen (or even tell him I have one), he is not responsible. (On the other hand, if I ask for my epi pen and he refuses it to me, then he is responsible.) He can’t just force me to take the medication because of the special relationship. His duty exists only to the extent that he has restricted my ability to act for myself.
I don’t see how that applies to the Eckert case, based on the facts that neither side disputes. Whether or not Eckert had drugs in his anal cavity, being placed in custody and taken to a medical facility did not restrict his ability to seek medical care if he chose to. He was specifically offered medical care and he refused it. I can understand the “special relationship” requiring that the police offer medical care to Eckert while he was in custody, and I can understand the “special relationship” requiring them to provide medical care to Eckert if he were unable to communicate (such as if he were unconscious). Either of those would seem to fit the “reasonable man” standard.
What I don’t understand is your insistence that the police should be allowed to force the medical care on Eckert against his will because of that “special relationship”. There is absolutely no evidence (And no one claiming) that Eckert was for any reason incompetent to make his own medical decisions, and the police’s actions didn’t limit his liberty to make those decisions, except to the extent allowed by the warrant.
If you were arguing that the colonoscopy was justified by the warrant, then that would be a different matter. But you haven’t argued that. You’ve argued that the colonoscopy was justified because the police had a duty to protect Eckert (even from himself) while he was in their custody. The research I’ve done so far doesn’t seem to hold that up based on the uncontested facts we have in this case.
The “duty to protect” simply isn’t as expansive as you have been portraying it.
Mas,
I’m sorry, but you seem to be taking part of what I said there out of context. Those articles provide some background, but they don’t match up with what you are claiming.
If you read those links, they discuss some of the limitations of the “duty to protect”, and it doesn’t appear to be as cut-and-dried as you are suggesting. The existence of a “special relationship” does not give the police license to do whatever they deem appropriate to protect the life of a person in custody. It is limited by several principles that you don’t seem to be recognizing in your comments.
The “special relationship” imposes an affirmative duty to protect only to such a degree as the government actor has limited the individual’s liberty to protect themselves, or to the extent that the government actor(s) created the danger.
To use a personal hypothetical, I am allergic to bees. If a police officer disarms me and handcuffs me, he is responsible to make sure that someone else doesn’t come along and beat me up or kill me. But, if I get stung by a bee and have an allergic reaction while I am handcuffed, and I refuse to accept an epi pen (or even tell him I have one), he is not responsible. (On the other hand, if I ask for my epi pen and he refuses it to me, then he is responsible.) He can’t just force me to take the medication because of the special relationship. His duty exists only to the extent that he has restricted my ability to act for myself.
I don’t see how that applies to the Eckert case, based on the facts that neither side disputes. Whether or not Eckert had drugs in his anal cavity, being placed in custody and taken to a medical facility did not restrict his ability to seek medical care if he chose to. He was specifically offered medical care and he refused it. I can understand the “special relationship” requiring that the police offer medical care to Eckert while he was in custody, and I can understand the “special relationship” requiring them to provide medical care to Eckert if he were unable to communicate (such as if he were unconscious). Either of those would seem to fit the “reasonable man” standard.
What I don’t understand is your insistence that the police should be allowed to force the medical care on Eckert against his will because of that “special relationship”. There is absolutely no evidence (And no one claiming) that Eckert was for any reason incompetent to make his own medical decisions, and the police’s actions didn’t limit his liberty to make those decisions, except to the extent allowed by the warrant.
If you were arguing that the colonoscopy was justified by the warrant, then that would be a different matter. But you haven’t argued that. You’ve argued that the colonoscopy was justified because the police had a duty to protect Eckert (even from himself) while he was in their custody. The research I’ve done so far doesn’t seem to hold that up based on the uncontested facts we have in this case.
The “duty to protect” simply isn’t as expansive as you have been portraying it.
Mas,
I’m sorry, but you seem to be taking part of what I said there out of context. Those articles provide some background, but they don’t match up with what you are claiming.
If you read those links, they discuss some of the limitations of the “duty to protect”, and it doesn’t appear to be as cut-and-dried as you are suggesting. The existence of a “special relationship” does not give the police license to do whatever they deem appropriate to protect the life of a person in custody. It is limited by several principles that you don’t seem to be recognizing in your comments.
The “special relationship” imposes an affirmative duty to protect only to such a degree as the government actor has limited the individual’s liberty to protect themselves, or to the extent that the government actor(s) created the danger.
To use a personal hypothetical, I am allergic to bees. If a police officer disarms me and handcuffs me, he is responsible to make sure that someone else doesn’t come along and beat me up or kill me. But, if I get stung by a bee and have an allergic reaction while I am handcuffed, and I refuse to accept an epi pen (or even tell him I have one), he is not responsible. (On the other hand, if I ask for my epi pen and he refuses it to me, then he is responsible.) He can’t just force me to take the medication because of the special relationship. His duty exists only to the extent that he has restricted my ability to act for myself.
I don’t see how that applies to the Eckert case, based on the facts that neither side disputes. Whether or not Eckert had drugs in his anal cavity, being placed in custody and taken to a medical facility did not restrict his ability to seek medical care if he chose to. He was specifically offered medical care and he refused it. I can understand the “special relationship” requiring that the police offer medical care to Eckert while he was in custody, and I can understand the “special relationship” requiring them to provide medical care to Eckert if he were unable to communicate (such as if he were unconscious). Either of those would seem to fit the “reasonable man” standard.
What I don’t understand is your insistence that the police should be allowed to force the medical care on Eckert against his will because of that “special relationship”. There is absolutely no evidence (And no one claiming) that Eckert was for any reason incompetent to make his own medical decisions, and the police’s actions didn’t limit his liberty to make those decisions, except to the extent allowed by the warrant.
If you were arguing that the colonoscopy was justified by the warrant, then that would be a different matter. But you haven’t argued that. You’ve argued that the colonoscopy was justified because the police had a duty to protect Eckert (even from himself) while he was in their custody. The research I’ve done so far doesn’t seem to hold that up based on the uncontested facts we have in this case.
The “duty to protect” simply isn’t as expansive as you have been portraying it.
Mas,
I’m sorry, but you seem to be taking part of what I said there out of context. Those articles provide some background, but they don’t match up with what you are claiming.
If you read those links, they discuss some of the limitations of the “duty to protect”, and it doesn’t appear to be as cut-and-dried as you are suggesting. The existence of a “special relationship” does not give the police license to do whatever they deem appropriate to protect the life of a person in custody. It is limited by several principles that you don’t seem to be recognizing in your comments.
The “special relationship” imposes an affirmative duty to protect only to such a degree as the government actor has limited the individual’s liberty to protect themselves, or to the extent that the government actor(s) created the danger.
To use a personal hypothetical, I am allergic to bees. If a police officer disarms me and handcuffs me, he is responsible to make sure that someone else doesn’t come along and beat me up or kill me. But, if I get stung by a bee and have an allergic reaction while I am handcuffed, and I refuse to accept an epi pen (or even tell him I have one), he is not responsible. (On the other hand, if I ask for my epi pen and he refuses it to me, then he is responsible.) He can’t just force me to take the medication because of the special relationship. His duty exists only to the extent that he has restricted my ability to act for myself.
I don’t see how that applies to the Eckert case, based on the facts that neither side disputes. Whether or not Eckert had drugs in his anal cavity, being placed in custody and taken to a medical facility did not restrict his ability to seek medical care if he chose to. He was specifically offered medical care and he refused it. I can understand the “special relationship” requiring that the police offer medical care to Eckert while he was in custody, and I can understand the “special relationship” requiring them to provide medical care to Eckert if he were unable to communicate (such as if he were unconscious). Either of those would seem to fit the “reasonable man” standard.
What I don’t understand is your insistence that the police should be allowed to force the medical care on Eckert against his will because of that “special relationship”. There is absolutely no evidence (And no one claiming) that Eckert was for any reason incompetent to make his own medical decisions, and the police’s actions didn’t limit his liberty to make those decisions, except to the extent allowed by the warrant.
If you were arguing that the colonoscopy was justified by the warrant, then that would be a different matter. But you haven’t argued that. You’ve argued that the colonoscopy was justified because the police had a duty to protect Eckert (even from himself) while he was in their custody. The research I’ve done so far doesn’t seem to hold that up based on the uncontested facts we have in this case.
The “duty to protect” simply isn’t as expansive as you have been portraying it.
Mas,
I’m sorry, but you seem to be taking part of what I said there out of context. Those articles provide some background, but they don’t match up with what you are claiming.
If you read those links, they discuss some of the limitations of the “duty to protect”, and it doesn’t appear to be as cut-and-dried as you are suggesting. The existence of a “special relationship” does not give the police license to do whatever they deem appropriate to protect the life of a person in custody. It is limited by several principles that you don’t seem to be recognizing in your comments.
The “special relationship” imposes an affirmative duty to protect only to such a degree as the government actor has limited the individual’s liberty to protect themselves, or to the extent that the government actor(s) created the danger.
To use a personal hypothetical, I am allergic to bees. If a police officer disarms me and handcuffs me, he is responsible to make sure that someone else doesn’t come along and beat me up or kill me. But, if I get stung by a bee and have an allergic reaction while I am handcuffed, and I refuse to accept an epi pen (or even tell him I have one), he is not responsible. (On the other hand, if I ask for my epi pen and he refuses it to me, then he is responsible.) He can’t just force me to take the medication because of the special relationship. His duty exists only to the extent that he has restricted my ability to act for myself.
I don’t see how that applies to the Eckert case, based on the facts that neither side disputes. Whether or not Eckert had drugs in his anal cavity, being placed in custody and taken to a medical facility did not restrict his ability to seek medical care if he chose to. He was specifically offered medical care and he refused it. I can understand the “special relationship” requiring that the police offer medical care to Eckert while he was in custody, and I can understand the “special relationship” requiring them to provide medical care to Eckert if he were unable to communicate (such as if he were unconscious). Either of those would seem to fit the “reasonable man” standard.
What I don’t understand is your insistence that the police should be allowed to force the medical care on Eckert against his will because of that “special relationship”. There is absolutely no evidence (And no one claiming) that Eckert was for any reason incompetent to make his own medical decisions, and the police’s actions didn’t limit his liberty to make those decisions, except to the extent allowed by the warrant.
If you were arguing that the colonoscopy was justified by the warrant, then that would be a different matter. But you haven’t argued that. You’ve argued that the colonoscopy was justified because the police had a duty to protect Eckert (even from himself) while he was in their custody. The research I’ve done so far doesn’t seem to hold that up based on the uncontested facts we have in this case.
The “duty to protect” simply isn’t as expansive as you have been portraying it.
To build on that, a few quotes from the aritcles that I cited illustrating my point about the limits of the “duty to protect” because of a “special relationship”:
“For example, if you arrest and handcuff a person and place him into the back seat of the police car for transportation to the station but you fail to secure him with a seat belt, any injuries he sustains if someone rear-ends your police car could make you and your employing agency liable for a due process violation. Since your prisoner was unable to put on his own seat belt, you had an affirmative duty to belt him in before driving away.”
In the above quote, the key to the “duty to protect” is that by handcuffing the prisoner, you make him unable to put on his own seat belt. As a result, you have the duty to do it for him.
“The opinion carefully distinguishes this situation from the “certain limited circumstances” in which the state has a special duty to an individual because it has restrained the individual’s liberty “through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint.” In such situations, the state must “assume some responsibility for [the individual’s] safety and general well-being” because the individual is unable to care for himself due to the state’s restraint.”
Note that the state doesn’t assume full responsibility for the individual because of a special relationship. They only assume a duty to protect when they have rendered the individual “unable to care for himself due to the state’s restraint”.
Again, I fail to see how in the Eckert case the police rendered Eckert “unable to care for himself”. They had him at a hospital, they had already examined him and not found sufficient evidence to charge him. (As a nitpick with your comments: none of the publicly available sources say that the doctors found anything in the earlier examinations – that is entirely an assumption on your part.) As a result, I fail to see how a “special relationship” permits the police to force a medical procedure on an individual under the basis of a “duty to protect”. It would have to be under the basis of the warrant, if at all.
And yet, there are significant 4th amendment issues with requiring surgery to carry out a warrant. As noted civil rights lawyer and processor Eugene Volokh has pointed out, under the standard in Winston vs Lee (1985), there is a reasonableness standard relating to whether any sort of surgical procedure (using a broad definition of the term) can be required based on a warrant, depending largely on the invasiveness of the procedure. (His example is that drawing blood is reasonable and minimally invasive, while surgery to extract a bullet lodged under the collarbone is not.) A colonoscopy would seem to be far more invasive than would be permitted under that standard (and, indeed was found to be so by the 5th Circuit in 2012 in US vs Gray).
Volokh’s commentary: http://www.volokh.com/2013/11/07/thoughts-eckert-v-city-deming/
To build on that, a few quotes from the aritcles that I cited illustrating my point about the limits of the “duty to protect” because of a “special relationship”:
“For example, if you arrest and handcuff a person and place him into the back seat of the police car for transportation to the station but you fail to secure him with a seat belt, any injuries he sustains if someone rear-ends your police car could make you and your employing agency liable for a due process violation. Since your prisoner was unable to put on his own seat belt, you had an affirmative duty to belt him in before driving away.”
In the above quote, the key to the “duty to protect” is that by handcuffing the prisoner, you make him unable to put on his own seat belt. As a result, you have the duty to do it for him.
“The opinion carefully distinguishes this situation from the “certain limited circumstances” in which the state has a special duty to an individual because it has restrained the individual’s liberty “through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint.” In such situations, the state must “assume some responsibility for [the individual’s] safety and general well-being” because the individual is unable to care for himself due to the state’s restraint.”
Note that the state doesn’t assume full responsibility for the individual because of a special relationship. They only assume a duty to protect when they have rendered the individual “unable to care for himself due to the state’s restraint”.
Again, I fail to see how in the Eckert case the police rendered Eckert “unable to care for himself”. They had him at a hospital, they had already examined him and not found sufficient evidence to charge him. (As a nitpick with your comments: none of the publicly available sources say that the doctors found anything in the earlier examinations – that is entirely an assumption on your part.) As a result, I fail to see how a “special relationship” permits the police to force a medical procedure on an individual under the basis of a “duty to protect”. It would have to be under the basis of the warrant, if at all.
And yet, there are significant 4th amendment issues with requiring surgery to carry out a warrant. As noted civil rights lawyer and processor Eugene Volokh has pointed out, under the standard in Winston vs Lee (1985), there is a reasonableness standard relating to whether any sort of surgical procedure (using a broad definition of the term) can be required based on a warrant, depending largely on the invasiveness of the procedure. (His example is that drawing blood is reasonable and minimally invasive, while surgery to extract a bullet lodged under the collarbone is not.) A colonoscopy would seem to be far more invasive than would be permitted under that standard (and, indeed was found to be so by the 5th Circuit in 2012 in US vs Gray).
Volokh’s commentary: http://www.volokh.com/2013/11/07/thoughts-eckert-v-city-deming/
To build on that, a few quotes from the aritcles that I cited illustrating my point about the limits of the “duty to protect” because of a “special relationship”:
“For example, if you arrest and handcuff a person and place him into the back seat of the police car for transportation to the station but you fail to secure him with a seat belt, any injuries he sustains if someone rear-ends your police car could make you and your employing agency liable for a due process violation. Since your prisoner was unable to put on his own seat belt, you had an affirmative duty to belt him in before driving away.”
In the above quote, the key to the “duty to protect” is that by handcuffing the prisoner, you make him unable to put on his own seat belt. As a result, you have the duty to do it for him.
“The opinion carefully distinguishes this situation from the “certain limited circumstances” in which the state has a special duty to an individual because it has restrained the individual’s liberty “through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint.” In such situations, the state must “assume some responsibility for [the individual’s] safety and general well-being” because the individual is unable to care for himself due to the state’s restraint.”
Note that the state doesn’t assume full responsibility for the individual because of a special relationship. They only assume a duty to protect when they have rendered the individual “unable to care for himself due to the state’s restraint”.
Again, I fail to see how in the Eckert case the police rendered Eckert “unable to care for himself”. They had him at a hospital, they had already examined him and not found sufficient evidence to charge him. (As a nitpick with your comments: none of the publicly available sources say that the doctors found anything in the earlier examinations – that is entirely an assumption on your part.) As a result, I fail to see how a “special relationship” permits the police to force a medical procedure on an individual under the basis of a “duty to protect”. It would have to be under the basis of the warrant, if at all.
And yet, there are significant 4th amendment issues with requiring surgery to carry out a warrant. As noted civil rights lawyer and processor Eugene Volokh has pointed out, under the standard in Winston vs Lee (1985), there is a reasonableness standard relating to whether any sort of surgical procedure (using a broad definition of the term) can be required based on a warrant, depending largely on the invasiveness of the procedure. (His example is that drawing blood is reasonable and minimally invasive, while surgery to extract a bullet lodged under the collarbone is not.) A colonoscopy would seem to be far more invasive than would be permitted under that standard (and, indeed was found to be so by the 5th Circuit in 2012 in US vs Gray).
Volokh’s commentary: http://www.volokh.com/2013/11/07/thoughts-eckert-v-city-deming/
To build on that, a few quotes from the aritcles that I cited illustrating my point about the limits of the “duty to protect” because of a “special relationship”:
“For example, if you arrest and handcuff a person and place him into the back seat of the police car for transportation to the station but you fail to secure him with a seat belt, any injuries he sustains if someone rear-ends your police car could make you and your employing agency liable for a due process violation. Since your prisoner was unable to put on his own seat belt, you had an affirmative duty to belt him in before driving away.”
In the above quote, the key to the “duty to protect” is that by handcuffing the prisoner, you make him unable to put on his own seat belt. As a result, you have the duty to do it for him.
“The opinion carefully distinguishes this situation from the “certain limited circumstances” in which the state has a special duty to an individual because it has restrained the individual’s liberty “through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint.” In such situations, the state must “assume some responsibility for [the individual’s] safety and general well-being” because the individual is unable to care for himself due to the state’s restraint.”
Note that the state doesn’t assume full responsibility for the individual because of a special relationship. They only assume a duty to protect when they have rendered the individual “unable to care for himself due to the state’s restraint”.
Again, I fail to see how in the Eckert case the police rendered Eckert “unable to care for himself”. They had him at a hospital, they had already examined him and not found sufficient evidence to charge him. (As a nitpick with your comments: none of the publicly available sources say that the doctors found anything in the earlier examinations – that is entirely an assumption on your part.) As a result, I fail to see how a “special relationship” permits the police to force a medical procedure on an individual under the basis of a “duty to protect”. It would have to be under the basis of the warrant, if at all.
And yet, there are significant 4th amendment issues with requiring surgery to carry out a warrant. As noted civil rights lawyer and processor Eugene Volokh has pointed out, under the standard in Winston vs Lee (1985), there is a reasonableness standard relating to whether any sort of surgical procedure (using a broad definition of the term) can be required based on a warrant, depending largely on the invasiveness of the procedure. (His example is that drawing blood is reasonable and minimally invasive, while surgery to extract a bullet lodged under the collarbone is not.) A colonoscopy would seem to be far more invasive than would be permitted under that standard (and, indeed was found to be so by the 5th Circuit in 2012 in US vs Gray).
Volokh’s commentary: http://www.volokh.com/2013/11/07/thoughts-eckert-v-city-deming/
To build on that, a few quotes from the aritcles that I cited illustrating my point about the limits of the “duty to protect” because of a “special relationship”:
“For example, if you arrest and handcuff a person and place him into the back seat of the police car for transportation to the station but you fail to secure him with a seat belt, any injuries he sustains if someone rear-ends your police car could make you and your employing agency liable for a due process violation. Since your prisoner was unable to put on his own seat belt, you had an affirmative duty to belt him in before driving away.”
In the above quote, the key to the “duty to protect” is that by handcuffing the prisoner, you make him unable to put on his own seat belt. As a result, you have the duty to do it for him.
“The opinion carefully distinguishes this situation from the “certain limited circumstances” in which the state has a special duty to an individual because it has restrained the individual’s liberty “through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint.” In such situations, the state must “assume some responsibility for [the individual’s] safety and general well-being” because the individual is unable to care for himself due to the state’s restraint.”
Note that the state doesn’t assume full responsibility for the individual because of a special relationship. They only assume a duty to protect when they have rendered the individual “unable to care for himself due to the state’s restraint”.
Again, I fail to see how in the Eckert case the police rendered Eckert “unable to care for himself”. They had him at a hospital, they had already examined him and not found sufficient evidence to charge him. (As a nitpick with your comments: none of the publicly available sources say that the doctors found anything in the earlier examinations – that is entirely an assumption on your part.) As a result, I fail to see how a “special relationship” permits the police to force a medical procedure on an individual under the basis of a “duty to protect”. It would have to be under the basis of the warrant, if at all.
And yet, there are significant 4th amendment issues with requiring surgery to carry out a warrant. As noted civil rights lawyer and processor Eugene Volokh has pointed out, under the standard in Winston vs Lee (1985), there is a reasonableness standard relating to whether any sort of surgical procedure (using a broad definition of the term) can be required based on a warrant, depending largely on the invasiveness of the procedure. (His example is that drawing blood is reasonable and minimally invasive, while surgery to extract a bullet lodged under the collarbone is not.) A colonoscopy would seem to be far more invasive than would be permitted under that standard (and, indeed was found to be so by the 5th Circuit in 2012 in US vs Gray).
Volokh’s commentary: http://www.volokh.com/2013/11/07/thoughts-eckert-v-city-deming/
The evidence so far public appears wholly consistent with Observer’s scenario #2, wherein the police officers didn’t merely hand over Eckert to the doctors out of an abundance of “duty of care” and wash their hands, but instead participated throughout the process. Officer Chavez *personally* poked through the victim’s stool, several times over several hours, and discussed with Odocha the search warrant’s existence (and the “nothing being located on the x-ray” !!) as the reason for the colonoscopy surgery.
(By the way, read Chavez’ own report about “surgery” — it’s mentioned over and over as such. Mas, surely you believe your “brother officer”. http://statelymcdanielmanor.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/chavez-doctors.png )
Here’s a thought experiment. Imagine that we’re right in this suspicion, and that Chavez et al. actively goaded the surgeon into the procedure out of spite or whatever. Should it be an adequate legal defence for them to concoct a story long after-the-fact, about them being worried for the life of Eckert, exigent circumstances somehow overruling his non-consent? Would an outsider view it as justice served? I certainly hope your answer would be “no”.
The evidence so far public appears wholly consistent with Observer’s scenario #2, wherein the police officers didn’t merely hand over Eckert to the doctors out of an abundance of “duty of care” and wash their hands, but instead participated throughout the process. Officer Chavez *personally* poked through the victim’s stool, several times over several hours, and discussed with Odocha the search warrant’s existence (and the “nothing being located on the x-ray” !!) as the reason for the colonoscopy surgery.
(By the way, read Chavez’ own report about “surgery” — it’s mentioned over and over as such. Mas, surely you believe your “brother officer”. http://statelymcdanielmanor.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/chavez-doctors.png )
Here’s a thought experiment. Imagine that we’re right in this suspicion, and that Chavez et al. actively goaded the surgeon into the procedure out of spite or whatever. Should it be an adequate legal defence for them to concoct a story long after-the-fact, about them being worried for the life of Eckert, exigent circumstances somehow overruling his non-consent? Would an outsider view it as justice served? I certainly hope your answer would be “no”.
The evidence so far public appears wholly consistent with Observer’s scenario #2, wherein the police officers didn’t merely hand over Eckert to the doctors out of an abundance of “duty of care” and wash their hands, but instead participated throughout the process. Officer Chavez *personally* poked through the victim’s stool, several times over several hours, and discussed with Odocha the search warrant’s existence (and the “nothing being located on the x-ray” !!) as the reason for the colonoscopy surgery.
(By the way, read Chavez’ own report about “surgery” — it’s mentioned over and over as such. Mas, surely you believe your “brother officer”. http://statelymcdanielmanor.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/chavez-doctors.png )
Here’s a thought experiment. Imagine that we’re right in this suspicion, and that Chavez et al. actively goaded the surgeon into the procedure out of spite or whatever. Should it be an adequate legal defence for them to concoct a story long after-the-fact, about them being worried for the life of Eckert, exigent circumstances somehow overruling his non-consent? Would an outsider view it as justice served? I certainly hope your answer would be “no”.
The evidence so far public appears wholly consistent with Observer’s scenario #2, wherein the police officers didn’t merely hand over Eckert to the doctors out of an abundance of “duty of care” and wash their hands, but instead participated throughout the process. Officer Chavez *personally* poked through the victim’s stool, several times over several hours, and discussed with Odocha the search warrant’s existence (and the “nothing being located on the x-ray” !!) as the reason for the colonoscopy surgery.
(By the way, read Chavez’ own report about “surgery” — it’s mentioned over and over as such. Mas, surely you believe your “brother officer”. http://statelymcdanielmanor.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/chavez-doctors.png )
Here’s a thought experiment. Imagine that we’re right in this suspicion, and that Chavez et al. actively goaded the surgeon into the procedure out of spite or whatever. Should it be an adequate legal defence for them to concoct a story long after-the-fact, about them being worried for the life of Eckert, exigent circumstances somehow overruling his non-consent? Would an outsider view it as justice served? I certainly hope your answer would be “no”.
The evidence so far public appears wholly consistent with Observer’s scenario #2, wherein the police officers didn’t merely hand over Eckert to the doctors out of an abundance of “duty of care” and wash their hands, but instead participated throughout the process. Officer Chavez *personally* poked through the victim’s stool, several times over several hours, and discussed with Odocha the search warrant’s existence (and the “nothing being located on the x-ray” !!) as the reason for the colonoscopy surgery.
(By the way, read Chavez’ own report about “surgery” — it’s mentioned over and over as such. Mas, surely you believe your “brother officer”. http://statelymcdanielmanor.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/chavez-doctors.png )
Here’s a thought experiment. Imagine that we’re right in this suspicion, and that Chavez et al. actively goaded the surgeon into the procedure out of spite or whatever. Should it be an adequate legal defence for them to concoct a story long after-the-fact, about them being worried for the life of Eckert, exigent circumstances somehow overruling his non-consent? Would an outsider view it as justice served? I certainly hope your answer would be “no”.
It’s time for a recap. I would strongly suggest that anyone actually interested in the truth of this topic, and not pursuing an agenda, read all the commentary above, including that found in the many links.
I would also like to thank the many people who made positive contributions to this discussion, particularly Dennis, who went above and beyond in explaining the reality of how things work.
9/12/14: I post the blog titled “Whose Vitriol, Whose Lies?” in response to a trollish comment and false accusation elsewhere by one “s.” I refute his claims and, documentably, prove him wrong. “s”, perhaps wiser than Observer and Frank Ch. Eigler, does not return.
On the same day, “Observer” asks me for sources as to police duty to care for people in custody, and implies that an out of court settlement equals guilt. The next day, the 13th, I reply that he should do some research and check with his state attorney general to answer the duty to care question for himself. (It is well known in law that settlement does NOT equal admission of guilt, which research shows was expressly the case in the settlement in question.)
On the 16th, Observer says the AG won’t give him an opinion. I post a decision from the Supreme Court of the United States decisively describing the duty to care in question. On the 17th, Observer – who said he had been unable to come up with any research before – magically publishes links which show that police do indeed have a duty to protect those in their custody.
And now, we have the latest posts by “Frank” and “Observer” on the 18th.
In the discussion above this post, I made it clear that endless, circular repetition of bogus claims will kill discussion threads anywhere, and that lying to the readers here will not be forgiven. As if to prove Dennis correct in his assertion that “Frank” and “Observer” are not only trolls but may be one and the same troll, “Frank/Observer” continue to imply that the cops forced the colonoscopy, when in fact, as I have repeatedly made clear and the facts show, it was the docs and not the cops who chose to take it that far.
This goes beyond being disingenuous; “Frank/Observer”; you’ve now hit “full deception.” On 9/18, “Frank” posted a link to a purported report by an involved officer stating that the DOCTOR told HIM (the cop) that the man in custody was going to be colonoscoped. What more proof does anyone need of what I’ve been saying all along: the cops’ duty was to take the guy to the docs, and the docs took it from there? Yet Frank/Observer still blame the cops for the colonoscope.
Enough is enough. I’ve been doing this blog for more than six years. I have invited and encouraged all opinions including dissenting ones, and opinions which dissed me personally. They all remained archived here at the Backwoos Home blogs, free for anyone to read, examine,a nd parse. First Amendment is as important to me as Second. During that time I can count on the fingers of one hand the number of discussion threads I’ve closed. The same is roughly true of people I’ve banned from commenting here. Off the top of my head, I can remember four bans. There were: the foul-mouthed cop-hater who couldn’t understand that here, “mother” is more than just half a word; the mid-teen kid whose babble bordered on psychosis; the guy who was making death threats; and the butt-wipe who lied to my readers and claimed that a high court decision meant the exact opposite of what it actually said. (Here’s a hint, troll boys: as soon as you think the readers won’t follow links and do their own research, and you’re smarter than they are, it is a good indication that you probably aren’t.)
The number of closed threads now increases by one, and the number of banned posters now increases by either 25% or 50%, depending on whether or not Dennis proves to be right in his assertion that “Frank” and “Observer” are one and the same troll.
Kvetch at me all you want here, disagree with me all you want here, but DO NOT LIE TO THE READERS HERE!
“Frank/Observer,” don’t let the door hit you in the butt(s) on the way out. (You’d probably call it “rape” anyway.)
Thread CLOSED.
It’s time for a recap. I would strongly suggest that anyone actually interested in the truth of this topic, and not pursuing an agenda, read all the commentary above, including that found in the many links.
I would also like to thank the many people who made positive contributions to this discussion, particularly Dennis, who went above and beyond in explaining the reality of how things work.
9/12/14: I post the blog titled “Whose Vitriol, Whose Lies?” in response to a trollish comment and false accusation elsewhere by one “s.” I refute his claims and, documentably, prove him wrong. “s”, perhaps wiser than Observer and Frank Ch. Eigler, does not return.
On the same day, “Observer” asks me for sources as to police duty to care for people in custody, and implies that an out of court settlement equals guilt. The next day, the 13th, I reply that he should do some research and check with his state attorney general to answer the duty to care question for himself. (It is well known in law that settlement does NOT equal admission of guilt, which research shows was expressly the case in the settlement in question.)
On the 16th, Observer says the AG won’t give him an opinion. I post a decision from the Supreme Court of the United States decisively describing the duty to care in question. On the 17th, Observer – who said he had been unable to come up with any research before – magically publishes links which show that police do indeed have a duty to protect those in their custody.
And now, we have the latest posts by “Frank” and “Observer” on the 18th.
In the discussion above this post, I made it clear that endless, circular repetition of bogus claims will kill discussion threads anywhere, and that lying to the readers here will not be forgiven. As if to prove Dennis correct in his assertion that “Frank” and “Observer” are not only trolls but may be one and the same troll, “Frank/Observer” continue to imply that the cops forced the colonoscopy, when in fact, as I have repeatedly made clear and the facts show, it was the docs and not the cops who chose to take it that far.
This goes beyond being disingenuous; “Frank/Observer”; you’ve now hit “full deception.” On 9/18, “Frank” posted a link to a purported report by an involved officer stating that the DOCTOR told HIM (the cop) that the man in custody was going to be colonoscoped. What more proof does anyone need of what I’ve been saying all along: the cops’ duty was to take the guy to the docs, and the docs took it from there? Yet Frank/Observer still blame the cops for the colonoscope.
Enough is enough. I’ve been doing this blog for more than six years. I have invited and encouraged all opinions including dissenting ones, and opinions which dissed me personally. They all remained archived here at the Backwoos Home blogs, free for anyone to read, examine,a nd parse. First Amendment is as important to me as Second. During that time I can count on the fingers of one hand the number of discussion threads I’ve closed. The same is roughly true of people I’ve banned from commenting here. Off the top of my head, I can remember four bans. There were: the foul-mouthed cop-hater who couldn’t understand that here, “mother” is more than just half a word; the mid-teen kid whose babble bordered on psychosis; the guy who was making death threats; and the butt-wipe who lied to my readers and claimed that a high court decision meant the exact opposite of what it actually said. (Here’s a hint, troll boys: as soon as you think the readers won’t follow links and do their own research, and you’re smarter than they are, it is a good indication that you probably aren’t.)
The number of closed threads now increases by one, and the number of banned posters now increases by either 25% or 50%, depending on whether or not Dennis proves to be right in his assertion that “Frank” and “Observer” are one and the same troll.
Kvetch at me all you want here, disagree with me all you want here, but DO NOT LIE TO THE READERS HERE!
“Frank/Observer,” don’t let the door hit you in the butt(s) on the way out. (You’d probably call it “rape” anyway.)
Thread CLOSED.
It’s time for a recap. I would strongly suggest that anyone actually interested in the truth of this topic, and not pursuing an agenda, read all the commentary above, including that found in the many links.
I would also like to thank the many people who made positive contributions to this discussion, particularly Dennis, who went above and beyond in explaining the reality of how things work.
9/12/14: I post the blog titled “Whose Vitriol, Whose Lies?” in response to a trollish comment and false accusation elsewhere by one “s.” I refute his claims and, documentably, prove him wrong. “s”, perhaps wiser than Observer and Frank Ch. Eigler, does not return.
On the same day, “Observer” asks me for sources as to police duty to care for people in custody, and implies that an out of court settlement equals guilt. The next day, the 13th, I reply that he should do some research and check with his state attorney general to answer the duty to care question for himself. (It is well known in law that settlement does NOT equal admission of guilt, which research shows was expressly the case in the settlement in question.)
On the 16th, Observer says the AG won’t give him an opinion. I post a decision from the Supreme Court of the United States decisively describing the duty to care in question. On the 17th, Observer – who said he had been unable to come up with any research before – magically publishes links which show that police do indeed have a duty to protect those in their custody.
And now, we have the latest posts by “Frank” and “Observer” on the 18th.
In the discussion above this post, I made it clear that endless, circular repetition of bogus claims will kill discussion threads anywhere, and that lying to the readers here will not be forgiven. As if to prove Dennis correct in his assertion that “Frank” and “Observer” are not only trolls but may be one and the same troll, “Frank/Observer” continue to imply that the cops forced the colonoscopy, when in fact, as I have repeatedly made clear and the facts show, it was the docs and not the cops who chose to take it that far.
This goes beyond being disingenuous; “Frank/Observer”; you’ve now hit “full deception.” On 9/18, “Frank” posted a link to a purported report by an involved officer stating that the DOCTOR told HIM (the cop) that the man in custody was going to be colonoscoped. What more proof does anyone need of what I’ve been saying all along: the cops’ duty was to take the guy to the docs, and the docs took it from there? Yet Frank/Observer still blame the cops for the colonoscope.
Enough is enough. I’ve been doing this blog for more than six years. I have invited and encouraged all opinions including dissenting ones, and opinions which dissed me personally. They all remained archived here at the Backwoos Home blogs, free for anyone to read, examine,a nd parse. First Amendment is as important to me as Second. During that time I can count on the fingers of one hand the number of discussion threads I’ve closed. The same is roughly true of people I’ve banned from commenting here. Off the top of my head, I can remember four bans. There were: the foul-mouthed cop-hater who couldn’t understand that here, “mother” is more than just half a word; the mid-teen kid whose babble bordered on psychosis; the guy who was making death threats; and the butt-wipe who lied to my readers and claimed that a high court decision meant the exact opposite of what it actually said. (Here’s a hint, troll boys: as soon as you think the readers won’t follow links and do their own research, and you’re smarter than they are, it is a good indication that you probably aren’t.)
The number of closed threads now increases by one, and the number of banned posters now increases by either 25% or 50%, depending on whether or not Dennis proves to be right in his assertion that “Frank” and “Observer” are one and the same troll.
Kvetch at me all you want here, disagree with me all you want here, but DO NOT LIE TO THE READERS HERE!
“Frank/Observer,” don’t let the door hit you in the butt(s) on the way out. (You’d probably call it “rape” anyway.)
Thread CLOSED.
Comments are closed.